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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL AUTHORITY* 
Christopher J. Peters† 
This article responds to a puzzling gap in the otherwise extensive 
literature on constitutional rights and judicial review:  a lack of at-
tention to the authority of constitutional rights.  Defenders and critics 
of judicially enforceable constitutional rights typically argue on 
grounds of political morality, contending that democratic legal sys-
tems should (or should not) adopt constitutional rights as a matter of 
policy.  That issue becomes irrelevant if the subjects of constitutional 
rights – government officials, legislators, judges, citizens – have little 
or no good reason to obey those rights.  This is a question of legal au-
thority; but most treatments of constitutional rights ignore it. 
The article begins to fill that gap by assessing the two dominant 
strains of rights-justification, Substantive and Procedural justifica-
tions, as accounts of legal authority.  Substantive justifications de-
fend constitutional rights as means of promoting morally good re-
sults; prominent theories from Alexander Hamilton’s to Alexander 
Bickel’s to Randy Barnett’s are types of Substantive account.  The au-
thor argues that Substantive justifications, while intuitively appeal-
ing and therefore common in public and political discourse, fail to 
persuasively explain the necessary authority of constitutional rights.  
In contrast, Procedural justifications defend constitutional rights as 
means of settling disputes about good results; the “representation-
reinforcement” approach of John Hart Ely and Carolene Products 
Footnote Four is the best-known Procedural account.  The article con-
tends that Procedural justifications fare considerably better than 
their Substantive rivals as accounts of constitutional authority.  In 
short, people have better reasons to obey constitutional rights on the 
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3 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL AUTHORITY* 
Christopher J. Peters† 
[T]his country’s original citizens believed that as human 
beings, they were entitled to free speech, and they in-
vented the First Amendment in order to protect it. The 
entire Bill of Rights was created to protect rights the 
original citizens believed were naturally theirs …. 
 
 From the ACLU website1 
 
The Declaration of Independence makes clear that the 
purpose for writing the Constitution was twofold.  It was 
written to grant the federal government the authority to 
impose upon specific liberties in order to protect the 
natural rights of citizens; it was also written to protect 
the rights of citizens from both the overreaching hand of 
government and outside oppressors. 
 
 From the FreedomWorks website2 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
* © Christopher J. Peters.  All rights reserved.  Please do not cite or quote this 
draft without the author’s express permission. 
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1 ACLU, The Bill of Rights:  A Brief History, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice_prisoners-rights_drug-law-reform_immigrants-
rights/bill-rights-brief-history. 
2 Matthew Clemente, The Constitutionality of Obama’s Mandate:  Reading the 
Constitution (2 of 8), available at http://www.freedomworks.org/blog/mclemente/the-
constitutionality-of-obamas-mandate-reading-th.  The “mission” of FreedomWorks, 
according to its website, is to “fight[] for lower taxes, less government and more eco-
nomic freedom for all Americans,” see http://www.freedomworks.org/about/our-
mission; the organization’s chairman is former Republican House majority leader 
Dick Armey, see http://www.freedomworks.org/about/chairman-dick-armey.  The 
New York Times describes FreedomWorks as “a Washington group that helped cul-
tivate the Tea Party movement.”  Michael Cooper and Katharine Q. Seelye, Wiscon-
sin Leads Way as Workers Fight State Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2011), available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/us/politics/19states.html?scp=3&sq=wisconsin%
20cuts&st=cse.  
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Courts must police inhibitions on expression and other 
political activity because we cannot trust elected offi-
cials to do so:  ins have a way of wanting to make sure 
the outs stay out. 
 
 John Hart Ely3 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: 
RIGHTS-JUSTIFICATIONS AND THE OVERLOOKED QUESTION OF 
LEGAL AUTHORITY 
here are many good recent critiques, and at least as 
many good recent defenses, of the idea of constitutional 
rights.4  Both the critiques and the defenses almost al-
ways assume a particular audience, one consisting of what we 
might call institutional designers.  Institutional designers are 
in a position either to invent or reinvent the governing institu-
tions of a society (like, say, the American Framers in the 1780s 
or the post-Soviet and post-apartheid-South-African nation-
builders of the 1990s), or (far more often) to seriously reassess 
some of the governing institutions the society already has (as 
happened during recent debates in Great Britain and New 
Zealand over the adoption of statutory Bills of Rights).5  In 
__________________________________________________________ 
3 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 106 
(1980). 
4 The critiques include JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 209-312 
(1999) (Part III); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 
115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) [hereinafter Waldron, Core Case]; and RICHARD BELLAMY, 
POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007).  The defenses include W.J. WALUCHOW, A 
COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:  THE LIVING TREE (2007); RONALD 
DWORKIN, Introduction:  The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise, in 
FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 10-38 (1996); 
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001); LAWRENCE 
G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES:  A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE (2004); and Richard J. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial 
Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (2008). 
5 In Britain, the Human Rights Act of 1998 authorized direct enforcement in 
British courts of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.  See 
Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42.  In New Zealand, the Bill of Rights Act of 1990 au-
thorized a weak form of judicial review by which judges must interpret other sta-
T 
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speaking to institutional designers, rights-critics and rights-
defenders usually argue in terms of policy or political morality 
– of why it is or is not a good idea for a society to adopt some 
form of judicially enforceable constitutional or quasi-
constitutional rights. 
So situated, these debates typically miss a crucial question 
about constitutional rights, namely the question of whether 
(and under what conditions) constitutional rights can possess 
legal authority.  In a nutshell, legal authority is the capacity of 
law to impose on its subjects a duty or strong reason to act, a 
duty that depends on the source of the norm in question, that 
does not depend on the threat of punishment for disobedience, 
and that is sufficiently salient to be perceived by the reasona-
ble legal subject.  Legal authority is necessary for legal systems 
generally to function, but it is especially important for consti-
tutional rights.  Without legal authority, no constitutional 
right would be effective – that is, would make much of a differ-
ence in the real world.  Those typically subject to constitutional 
rights – elected or appointed government officials (particularly 
high-level ones), judges, and ultimately the democratic majori-
ty itself – rarely can be effectively punished for violating or ig-
noring them.  Absent some perceived duty to obey constitution-
al rights, then, these actors often would simply disobey, and 
the rights in question would become dead letters – mere words 
on parchment, or on the twenty-first-century equivalent the-
reof. 
Debates about constitutional rights that are directed at in-
stitutional designers tend to overlook the issue of legal authori-
                                                                                                                       
tutes to avoid conflict, if possible, with the rights enumerated in the Act.  See New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109.  Although each of these “bills 
of rights” has the formal status only of an ordinary statute, subject to amendment or 
repeal through the regular legislative process, it seems clear that the practical ob-
stacles to repeal have conferred on each Act a quasi-constitutional status.  The Acts 
thus edge Britain and New Zealand closer to an American model of judicially enfor-
ceable constitutional rights. 
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ty because it does not seem like a question of primary impor-
tance to their audience.  Institutional designers create new le-
gal systems or tweak existing ones; the assumption is that the 
legal systems thus created or tweaked will, generally speaking, 
be obeyed.  But what if this were not the case?  Then there 
would be no point in creating or tweaking the legal systems to 
begin with.  Arguments about Bills of Rights and judicial re-
view would take on a sort of counterfactual air, like alternate-
history novels about the South winning the Civil War (but less 
entertaining).  They would become academic in the driest and 
least productive sense. 
It seems fairly clear, of course, that the participants in these 
debates are correct to assume that constitutional rights (gener-
ally speaking) are treated, or would be treated if adopted, as 
carrying legal authority in most or all of the societies in play.  
The question I want to explore in this article, then, is not 
whether constitutional rights can or typically do possess legal 
authority.  My question, rather, is what the overlooked ques-
tion of legal authority might tell us about these normative de-
bates over constitutional rights.  In particular, I want to ask 
whether any of the chief defenses of constitutional rights that 
have been advanced can adequately account for their legal au-
thority – can adequately explain how constitutional rights, so 
defended, are capable of imposing the kind of duty or strong 
reason for obedience that legal authority requires.  If the an-
swer is no – if none of the influential rights-justifications can 
explain the legal authority of Bills of Rights – then the rights-
critics will have a new and effective, perhaps even fatal, arrow 
in their quiver.  (What is the point of constitutional rights that 
no one has a duty to obey?)  On the other hand, if the answer 
(as I will in fact suggest) is that some rights-justifications can 
explain legal authority better than others, then the rights-
defenders can toss out the blunt arrows and concentrate on fir-
ing the good ones. 
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In order to engage the question of legal authority we need to 
focus on the perspective, not of the institutional designer, but 
of the legal subject – the person, or the institution or collection 
of persons, who is faced with the decision whether to do what a 
constitutional right commands (or, more typically, to refrain 
from doing what it forbids).  This is precisely the perspective 
that the normative debate over constitutional rights usually 
ignores.  But it is the locus where the results of that debate 
must be operationalized, the contact point where the constitu-
tional rubber meets the road.  If the legal subject (the legal 
official, the legislator, the judge, the voter) is simply going to 
ignore constitutional rights, then having constitutional rights 
is neither good nor bad, essential nor catastrophic; it is at most 
a waste of time. 
This paper therefore uses the perspective of the subject of 
constitutional rights to assess the possible grounds on which 
those rights can claim legal authority.  I argue that one family 
of rights-justifications, which I call Substantive justifications, 
fails to offer legal subjects a good-enough, strong-enough rea-
son to obey constitutional rights with which they disagree.  The 
basic assertion of Substantive justifications is this:  Constitu-
tional rights should be obeyed because (and to the extent that) 
they will lead us to a morally correct or optimal or desirable 
result.  The first two quotations that open this paper – from 
two organizations that could hardly be more opposed on most 
topics of political morality – exemplify versions of Substantive 
justifications.  As these quotes suggest, Substantive justifica-
tions are, in a simple form, fashionable in political and popular 
discourse; in a more nuanced form they are common in aca-
demic theory.  But they are flawed, perhaps fatally so, as ac-
counts of legal authority.  Or so I will argue. 
I also contend that a rival type of rights-justification, which I 
call a Procedural justification, fares much better as an expla-
nation of legal authority:  It confers upon legal subjects some-
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thing like a prima facie duty of obedience to constitutional 
rights.  Procedural justifications contend that constitutional 
rights should be obeyed because (and to the extent that) ob-
edience helps avoid or mitigate or resolve certain kinds of dis-
putes.  The third quotation above, from John Hart Ely’s justly 
influential Democracy and Distrust, illustrates a type of proce-
dural justification.  While Ely’s and related versions of Proce-
duralism lack the widespread popular appeal of their Substan-
tive rivals, they constitute the chief alternative to Substantiv-
ism within judicial practice and academic theory.  I will sug-
gest here that they have a significant advantage over their 
Substantive counterparts as accounts of the legal authority of 
constitutional rights. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Part II, I articulate an 
understanding of the concept of legal authority, one derived 
from (though perhaps not entirely coextensive with) the stan-
dard accounts.  In Part III, I flesh out two versions of the Subs-
tantive justification – a simple and a more-nuanced version – 
and assess them according to the components of legal authority 
identified in Part II, finding them wanting in a number of im-
portant respects.  In Part IV, I give the same treatment to Pro-
cedural justifications (using Ely’s version as a framework), but 
with more sanguine results.  Part V is a brief conclusion. 
II.  THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
The idea of legal authority is among the most complex and 
elusive concepts in legal philosophy; given its centrality to the 
law, surprisingly few elements of the concept can be considered 
settled.6  Many aspects of this debate are, thankfully, well 
beyond my focus here.  I will try to sketch, at a middling level 
of detail, a basic version of the concept that will allow us to as-
__________________________________________________________ 
6 For a summary of the debate that also stakes out a provocative position in it, 
see Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382-439 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
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sess the competing rights-justifications in a meaningful way.  
While I believe the substance of the concept as I describe it 
here is fairly standard, my terminology sometimes will not be;7 
so I will try to be careful in defining my terms and in cross-
referencing more common ones where appropriate.  
It will help to begin with a fairly straightforward illustration 
of legal authority at work, taken from the context of constitu-
tional rights in deference to the central focus of this paper.  
Suppose George, the chief executive of a contemporary Western 
democracy, is asked by his national-security advisors to au-
thorize intelligence agencies to conduct electronic surveillance 
of terrorism suspects without obtaining judicial search war-
rants.  And suppose George believes that authorizing the war-
rantless surveillance would be the morally best thing to do, 
taking account of all the relevant nonlegal factors.  But sup-
pose George’s legal advisors tell him that the warrantless sur-
veillance he is contemplating would violate a provision of their 
nation’s constitution that has been interpreted to prohibit cer-
tain kinds of searches without a judicially issued warrant.  If 
George believes this constitutional provision (as interpreted) is 
legally authoritative – that is, that it possesses valid legal au-
thority – he will take its existence as a very powerful reason 
not to authorize the surveillance, despite his belief that the 
surveillance would, absent the law, be the morally best course 
of action.  (Even if George attributes legal authority to the con-
stitutional provision, he still may ultimately decide to author-
ize the surveillance despite the constitutional prohibition 
against it; but at least he will recognize the existence of that 
__________________________________________________________ 
7 For instance, I will not use the common term “content-independent” to describe 
an essential feature (actually a combination of features, I believe) of legal authority.  
(For a typical account of the meaning of that term, see Shapiro, supra note 6, at 
389.)  I think the focus on whether it is the “content” of a norm that confers its nor-
mativity is misleading, as the concept of “content” is extremely vague, and because 
what usually is meant by “content-independence” seems to encompass a number of 
phenomena that have little or nothing to do with “content.”  See infra notes 16-20 
and accompanying text. 
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prohibition as a strong countervailing influence against his 
own unalloyed moral judgment.) 
As this example reveals, legal authority has the potential to 
motivate a morally responsible actor to perform some action he 
otherwise would deem morally inappropriate, or to refrain from 
some action he otherwise would deem morally appropriate.  
But what are the properties of legal authority that confer this 
special capacity to change the existing moral landscape? 
The illustration suggests at least five such properties, each 
of which I discuss in more detail below.  First, legal authority 
supplies an operative reason to act, that is, a reason that ac-
tually alters the applicable moral calculus, serving as a reason 
to act, not just to believe something or think in a certain way.  
Second, legal authority supplies a reason to act that has special 
normative force, akin to that of a prima facie duty rather than 
a garden-variety reason for action.  Third, the reason provided 
by legal authority is noncoercive:  It does not turn on the threat 
of some formal sanction for violating the relevant norm.  
Fourth, that reason is source-dependent:  Its special status de-
pends on the derivation of the norm in question.  And fifth, the 
reason is salient, in the sense that its possession of the other 
necessary properties of legal authority is readily apparent to a 
reasonable legal subject. 
A.  Operativeness 
An authoritative legal norm must supply a reason that is 
operative, that is, a reason to act that alters the applicable bal-
ance of reasons rather than simply affecting the way a legal 
subject assesses those reasons.8 
__________________________________________________________ 
8 The relevant distinction here often is referred to as the distinction between “a 
reason to act” and “a reason to believe,” or between a “normative” and an “epistemic” 
reason.  See, e.g., John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 440, 444 (2002). 
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Consider here the distinction between a truly authoritative 
norm and a piece of mere advice or advocacy.  Our hypothetical 
chief executive, in deciding whether to authorize warrantless 
electronic surveillance of terrorism suspects, will face many 
nonlegal reasons applicable to his decision, some favoring the 
surveillance (e.g., it would promote national security) and some 
opposing it (e.g., it would invade the privacy of some innocent 
persons).  Now suppose that a trusted advisor, asked by George 
for her advice, counsels against the surveillance on the ground 
that it would impose too great a cost to personal privacy with 
relatively little benefit to national security.  This advice may 
change the way George himself assesses the applicable rea-
sons; it might cause him to scrutinize the alleged national-
security benefits of the surveillance more carefully than he 
otherwise would have done, for example.  But the advice is un-
likely to change the balance of applicable reasons itself.  George 
will not think that the advice creates some new reason to act 
that did not exist before the advice was given, or that the ad-
vice somehow alters the status of the existing reasons (by mak-
ing the benefit to national security weaker than it would have 
been without the advice, for instance, or making the harm to 
personal privacy stronger).9 
Now suppose George encounters a white paper by a civil-
liberties advocacy group, arguing against the type of surveil-
lance being proposed as a serious threat to personal privacy.  
Again, the group’s advocacy might change the way George as-
sesses the applicable reasons for action – perhaps correcting 
some misconceptions he might otherwise have held, for exam-
ple.  But the advocacy (again) will not alter the balance of ap-
plicable reasons itself.  George will not treat the advocacy as 
__________________________________________________________ 
9 Some have suggested that advice provides, or can provide, a new reason for act-
ing in accordance with it.  See, e.g., Stefan Sciaraffa, On Content-Independent Rea-
sons:  It’s Not in the Name, 28 L. & PHIL. 233 (2009).  I am skeptical that this is accu-
rate as a description of our practice; but even if it is, surely advice does not always, 
or necessarily, provide such a reason. 
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creating some new reason to act or as affecting the status of 
the existing reasons. 
An authoritative legal norm, however – say, the constitu-
tional warrantless-search provision forbidding the surveillance 
– functions quite differently from these examples of advice and 
advocacy:  It actually changes the previously existent set of 
reasons relevant to action.  Imagine two parallel universes, 
identical in every respect except for the following:  In Universe 
A there is no constitutional provision prohibiting the electronic 
surveillance George must consider, while in Universe B there 
is such a provision.  Now imagine that George in Universe A, in 
the midst of deciding whether to authorize the surveillance, 
finds himself suddenly, magically transported to Universe B.  
What effect will the emergence of a legal norm forbidding the 
surveillance have on George’s moral reasoning?  Not that of 
mere advice or advocacy:  The legal norm will not simply 
change the way George thinks about the balance of reasons for 
action.  Instead it will change that balance of reasons itself; it 
will add a new reason to the mix, one that did not exist without 
the legal norm.10  
Another way to put this point is to note that authoritative 
legal norms provide reasons to act, not just reasons to believe 
or to think about how to act.  The advisor’s counsel and the 
rights group’s advocacy are intended to inform (and may have 
the effect of informing) George’s own process of thinking about 
what he should do; but the constitutional provision is intended 
to motivate (and has the effect of motivating) his action itself, 
not just his process of thinking about it. 
__________________________________________________________ 
10 It might even alter the status of the existing reasons, by, for example, 
preempting them (see JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 57-62 (1986)) or re-
quiring that they be reweighted (see Stephen Perry, Second Order Reasons, Uncer-
tainty, and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 932-36 (1989); Stephen Perry, Judi-
cial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 215 (1987).  
See generally Shapiro, supra note 6, at 404-05, 408-12.  
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B.  Special Force 
Legal philosophers debate the precise normative force and 
mechanics of the type of reason that is embodied in legal au-
thority,11 but clearly an authoritative legal norm provides more 
than simply a garden-variety reason to act.  Consider again 
George’s process of deciding whether to authorize the warrant-
less electronic surveillance.  Suppose he assigns different nu-
merical weights to each of the applicable reasons, on a scale 
from one (least weighty) to ten (most weighty); he might as-
sign, say, a weight of eight to “the surveillance will promote 
national security,” a weight of five to “the surveillance will in-
vade the privacy of some innocent people,” and so on.  And 
suppose that after assigning a numerical weight to each appli-
cable reason, George makes his decision by comparing the total 
weight of the reasons in favor of the surveillance against the 
total weight of the reasons opposing it. 
Now suppose that in addition to all the other applicable rea-
sons, George considers the fact that the nation’s constitution 
would prohibit the proposed surveillance.  Suppose he assigns 
that reason, too, some numerical weight from one to ten (say, a 
nine); and suppose that after considering all the applicable 
reasons together, weighting them and setting them off against 
the contending reasons, he concludes that the morally best 
thing to do is to refuse to authorize the surveillance. 
This reasoning process seems to miss the point of treating 
the constitutional provision as an authoritative legal norm; for 
we do not typically treat legal norms as simply one of many 
commensurate reasons relevant to action, a reason that can be 
tossed into the hopper with a host of competing reasons and 
__________________________________________________________ 
11 For surveys of contemporary debates on these issues, see Shapiro, supra note 
6, at 385-93 (generally describing the “paradoxes of authority” – the alleged tension 
between authority on the one hand and autonomy and rationality on the other); 393-
402 (describing and assessing attempts to “weaken” the concept of authority by de-
nying its capacity to impose strict moral obligations); 402-15 (describing and assess-
ing attempts to define the normative mechanics of authoritative obligation). 
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that may or may not tip the balance in one direction or the oth-
er.  Typically we treat legal norms as imposing something akin 
to a duty to act, albeit a duty that might in some circumstances 
be vitiated or outweighed by some opposing duty.12  Again, the 
precise strength and nature of this duty need not concern us 
here; for present purposes we can think of legal authority simp-
ly as imposing a prima facie duty to act, one that presumptive-
ly outweighs any contrary applicable reasons but that might, 
on occasion, be outweighed by them. 
C.  Noncoerciveness 
The authority of a legal norm also must be noncoercive:  The 
existence and force of the reason to act that it supplies cannot 
depend on the possibility of formal sanction for violating the 
norm.  It is true that legal norms typically are paired with 
sanctions to be imposed if they are violated; the threat of pu-
nishment for disobedience is a common, perhaps a ubiquitous, 
feature of legal systems.  But legitimate coercion follows legi-
timate authority, not the other way around. 
As a conceptual matter, this is evident in the distinction be-
tween an authoritative legal norm and a mere demand backed 
by a threat.  Suppose our chief executive is blackmailed by an 
opponent of the proposed electronic surveillance who threatens 
to publicize evidence of George’s marital infidelity if he autho-
rizes the program.  This threat will of course create a reason, 
perhaps a very powerful one, for George to act; but it will not 
be the same sort of reason that the law creates.  George will 
feel no normative compulsion to do the blackmailer’s bidding 
apart from the in terrorem effect of the threat.  In considering 
the constitutional provision, on the other hand, George is likely 
to feel some compulsion to obey that provision quite apart from 
__________________________________________________________ 
12 For an argument that the duty imposed by legal authority cannot be absolute, 
see CHRISTOPHER J. PETERS, A MATTER OF DISPUTE:  MORALITY, DEMOCRACY, AND LAW 
33-36, 44-47 (2011).  
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any danger of being penalized for not doing so.  He is likely, 
that is, to identify a reason to obey that provision that is en-
tirely independent of the threat of sanction – a reason alto-
gether absent in the case of the blackmailer’s threat. 
The phenomenon by which a legal subject perceives a reason 
to obey the law quite apart from the threat of sanction is what 
H.L.A. Hart famously described as the “internal aspect” of the 
law.13  As a practical matter, the internal aspect is a necessary 
ingredient of any modern legal system, in which many or most 
instances of legal disobedience will go undetected and unpu-
nished.  Its function is even more vital in the realm of constitu-
tional law, as those subject to constitutional norms often will 
not be susceptible to “punishment” for “disobedience” in any 
meaningful sense.  Powerful government officials like chief ex-
ecutives, legislators, administrators, and judges often will be 
able to violate constitutional norms without detection, by, for 
example, concealing constitutional violations or dressing them 
up to look constitutionally permissible (in a cleverly drafted 
judicial opinion, for instance).  And of course the ultimate legal 
subject in the constitutional context is the democratic majority 
itself, an entity that cannot be formally “punished” for choosing 
to exceed its supposed constitutional limitations. 
This, again, is not to deny that punishment often (justifia-
bly) follows disobedience of legal norms.  Legal subjects, after 
all, sometimes will disobey the law in bad faith, or will mista-
kenly believe they are justified in disobeying the law; punish-
ment might be appropriate to retribute for or deter these in-
stances.14  The point is only that the existence of legal authority 
cannot itself depend on the threat of formal punishment for 
disobedience. 
__________________________________________________________ 
13 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56-57 (2d ed. 1994) (1961). 
14 Punishment might even be justified in instances where a legal subject has jus-
tifiably disobeyed the law.  See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF 
RULES: MORALITY, RULES, & THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 53–95 (2001); but see Heidi M. 
Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2203 (1992).   
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D.  Source-dependence 
The authoritativeness of a legal norm also depends on the 
source of that norm; the norm supplies a special reason to act 
(one that is operative, has special normative force, and does not 
turn on coercion) only if that norm derives from a certain type 
of person, institution, or process.  Imagine a prohibition on un-
reasonable searches that has exactly the same substantive con-
tent as the prohibition contained in the constitution applicable 
to our hypothetical chief executive; but suppose that prohibi-
tion is contained in the constitution of a neighboring country, 
or in a defunct version of her own nation’s constitution, or on a 
cocktail napkin with the word “Constitution” scrawled on it.  
None of these supposed norms will have the same impact on 
George’s reasoning as will a norm actually embedded in his na-
tion’s constitutional law.  He is unlikely to understand these 
pseudo-legal norms as creating an actual operative reason for 
him to act – certainly not an operative reason that has the kind 
of special normative force that law possesses, akin to a prima 
facie duty.  The obvious problem is that these supposed norms 
do not derive from a process George recognizes as a legitimate 
source of law-creation within the system to which he is subject. 
Note that the problem is not (necessarily) that these norms 
lack the status of law:  The foreign constitutional provision is 
law, albeit in another system, and the defunct provision was 
law in the system in question.  (We might even imagine a bi-
zarre secret society that treats scribblings on cocktail napkins 
as legally binding.)  The problem, rather, is that these sup-
posed norms are not legally authoritative in the context at 
hand; and that is a function of their source. 
E.  Salience 
Finally, in order for a legal norm to be effectively authorita-
tive, not just theoretically so, it must provide a reason to act 
whose possession of these other criteria – its operativeness, 
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special force, noncoerciveness, and source-dependence – is suf-
ficiently salient, that is, evident or accessible to a reasonable 
legal subject.15  The requirement of salience flows from the fact 
that any given legal subject can perceive legal authority, like 
other factors relevant to her moral reasoning, only through her 
own capacity to engage in such reasoning.  Legal authority that 
exists in some objective sense but is not capable of being per-
ceived by a legal subject is useless in practice. 
Suppose, for instance, that at some time in the distant past, 
the legislature in our fictional democracy, following all the re-
quired procedures, had enacted a statute forbidding precisely 
the type of surveillance George is now considering; but suppose 
that due to some clerical error, the legislation was not properly 
recorded in the country’s official statute books and is unknown 
to George and his advisors.  Imagine that one of these advisors 
now unearths the text of this ancient statute, but can find no 
evidence that the text was ever validly enacted into law.  The 
statutory prohibition seems to meet the other requirements of 
authoritative law:  It creates an operative reason for action, 
one with special normative force that does not turn on coercion 
and that is dependent on the source of the relevant norm.  But 
as a practical matter George is unlikely to recognize that the 
statute creates this kind of legal reason, because at least one of 
these qualities – the statute’s source – is not apparent to him, 
and thus its other qualities are concealed as well. 
Here again it is easy to miss the true nature of the problem.  
The problem is not (necessarily) that George fails to recognize 
that the statute provides some sort of reason relevant to his de-
__________________________________________________________ 
15 Salience might be seen as an aspect, or perhaps an implication, of the re-
quirement of “promulgation” that Lon Fuller cited as one of the necessary elements 
of effective law.  Fuller argued that law can only function as law if legal officials 
“publicize, or at least … make available to the affected party, the rules he is ex-
pected to observe.”  LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969); see also 
id. at 49-51.  This requirement seems to entail a concomitant requirement that the 
rules’ status as binding law be understandable by the affected party – i.e., a re-
quirement of what I have called salience. 
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cision how to act.  He may take the statute as a sort of advice 
or advocacy, for example; or perhaps he has a strange fetish for 
statute-like communiqués and is inclined to treat it as creating 
an actual operative reason for action.  The problem, rather, is 
that whatever reason to act, or to think about how to act, 
George attributes to the statute, it is unlikely to be the same 
sort of reason he would attribute to the statute were he aware 
of its status as valid law.  What causes the statute to lack effec-
tive authority is not the legal subject’s failure to take any ac-
count of it in his reasoning, but rather his failure to take prop-
er account of it as an authoritative norm. 
This point about salience may seem so obvious as to be trivi-
al:  Of course the reasons supplied by authoritative law, like 
any morally applicable reasons, must actually be accessible by 
the person doing the reasoning in order to be effective; but so 
what?  Why should we consider this quality to be a central 
property of legal authority?  As it happens, standard accounts 
of legal authority attribute substantial importance to the prop-
erty I am referring to here as salience (although typically they 
do so sub rosa).  Standard accounts typically hold that authori-
tative norms must be “content-independent,” a term coined by 
H.L.A. Hart.16  Hart described the concept of content-
independence this way: 
Content-independence of commands lies in the fact that a 
commander may issue many different commands to the same or 
to different people and the actions commanded may have noth-
ing in common, yet in the case of all of them the commander in-
tends his expressions of intention to be taken as a reason for 
doing them.  It is therefore intended to function as a reason in-
dependently of the nature or character of the actions to be 
done.17 
__________________________________________________________ 
16 Hart first used the term in H.L.A. HART, Legal and Moral Obligation, in 
ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 102 (A.I. Melden, ed. 1958). 
17 H.L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON 
BENTHAM 254-55 (1982). 
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Post-Hartian theorists of legal positivism almost universally 
have endorsed the notion that authoritative law must supply 
“content-independent” reasons in this sense.18  But the precise 
concept of content-independence is mysterious and contested.19 
I believe the idea of content-independence is best seen as 
shorthand for the conjunction of three of the properties of legal 
authority I have canvassed here, namely operativeness, source-
dependence, and salience.  The central thrust of content-
independence is the capacity of an authoritative norm to moti-
vate a legal subject to take some action she would not other-
wise have taken, precisely because it is an authority that com-
mands the action.  Part of this work is done by the property I 
have termed operativeness:  An operative reason is one that 
actually changes the existing balance of applicable reasons and 
thus is capable of motivating the actor to do something she 
would not have done without that reason.  Another part of the 
work is done by the property of source-dependence:  The special 
reason provided by an authoritative legal is special precisely 
because it is the law (or some other authority) that creates the 
norm.  And the final bit of the work is done by the property of 
salience:  Authority requires that actors subject to it recognize 
the special nature of the reason it supplies in order for a norm 
“to be taken as a reason” for doing what it commands.  These 
three properties, taken together, seem to capture what Hart 
meant by content-independence:  the capacity of an authorita-
tive command to create its own “reason for doing” a thing, a 
reason that is “taken as” a reason and that is “independent[] of 
the nature or character of the action[] to be done” – that is, of 
__________________________________________________________ 
18 See sources cited in Sciaraffa, supra note 9; see also Shapiro, supra note 11, at 
389-91. 
19 See Sciaraffa, supra note 9; P. Marwick, Law and Content-Independent Rea-
sons, 20 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 579-96 (2000). 
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the existing (prelegal) balance of applicable reasons, as per-
ceived by the actor.20 
 
* * * 
In order for a rule, command, or other norm to possess effec-
tive legal authority, then, it must possess at least the five cha-
racteristics I have described in this section.  It must be opera-
tive – capable of altering the balance of applicable reasons for 
action.  It must have special normative force, akin to a prima 
facie duty to act.  It must be noncoercive, deriving its opera-
tiveness and special force from something other than the threat 
of sanction for disobedience.  It must be source-dependent – re-
liant for its other qualities on the identity of the process that 
__________________________________________________________ 
20 Hart does use the locution of “intent” to describe content-independent reasons 
(“[T]he commander intends his expressions of intention to be taken as a reason for 
doing [what he commands]”), an ingredient that Stefan Sciaraffa sees as essential to 
the concept of content-independence and thus to the concept of legal authority more 
generally.  See Sciaraffa, supra note 9.  I doubt, however, that anything that can 
properly be called “intent” plays a necessary role in legal authority.  It is true that 
often there will be some actor (individual or collective) clothed with legal authority 
that can be said to have “intended” that its commands be followed, but legal authori-
ty can and often does exist without this phenomenon.  There are, first of all, well-
known conceptual difficulties with attempts to ascribe “intent” to collective deci-
sionmaking bodies such as legislatures.  See, e.g.., RONALD DWORKIN, The Forum of 
Principle, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33, 34-57 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, Forum 
of Principle].  Even if we assume a lawmaker that is capable of forming an intent, it 
is likely that its laws will apply in some circumstances that they did not foresee and 
with respect to which they could not therefore have formed any intent; this is the 
import of the legal “principles” describe by Ronald Dworkin, for example. See 
RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-45 (1977-
1978).  And it is likely that legal norms can arise without any actor’s ever conscious-
ly forming an intent that they be legal norms, as in cases of law by custom. 
I think the function that Hart (implicitly, perhaps accidentally) and Sciaraffa 
(deliberately) ascribe to intent within the concept of authority can be served just as 
well by the property of source-dependence combined with the property of salience.  
What is crucial in Hart’s description of content-independence is not the fact that the 
commander intends his commands to be taken as reasons for action, but rather the 
fact that those subject to his commands perceive those commands as reasons for ac-
tion.  The quintessential quality of authoritative commands to which Hart alludes – 
that they be taken as reasons (or as providing reasons) for action without regard to 
what it is they command – can be explained as readily, perhaps more readily, by 
their property of source-dependence than by the (contingent) possibility that some 
actor intends for them to be taken this way. 
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generated it.  And it must be salient; its possession of these 
other characteristics must be sufficiently evident or accessible 
to a reasonable legal subject. 
F.  A Note on the Identity of the Legal Subject in Debates about 
Constitutional Rights 
General accounts of legal authority – that is, attempts to jus-
tify the authority of most or all legal norms within a system of 
law – must explain how law can impose a prima facie duty of 
obedience on a wide range of legal subjects in a wide range of 
circumstances, from chief executives deciding how to treat sus-
pected terrorists to pedestrians deciding when to cross the 
street.  Such an account would have to explain why people or 
organizations acting in a private capacity – as subjects rather 
than makers or enforcers of the law – have a duty to obey what 
H.L.A. Hart called “primary” legal rules, that is, rules by which 
“human beings are required to do or abstain from certain ac-
tions.”21  It also would have to explain why people acting as le-
gal officials – chief executives, legislators, judges, bureaucrats, 
on down to citizens exercising their rights to vote and to en-
gage in political speech and association – have a duty to obey 
the “secondary” rules22 that determine their powers and re-
sponsibilities as legal officials, rules that establish the legal 
system of which they are a part and govern how that system is 
to function.23 
The inquiry for purposes of this article need not be nearly so 
broad.  In most instances, constitutional rights purport to di-
rectly constrain only what in American doctrine are called 
“state actors” – government officials and institutions.24  While 
__________________________________________________________ 
21 HART, supra note 13, at 81. 
22 See id. (defining “secondary” legal rules). 
23 I have attempted to sketch the foundations of this sort of general account in 
PETERS, supra note 12. 
24 The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S Constitution is an exception to this 
general rule, prohibiting as it does “slavery or involuntary servitude” regardless of 
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we often think of the Constitution as consisting of Hartian sec-
ondary rules, in fact constitutional rights typically act as pri-
mary rules with respect to these actors.  Theorists, politicians, 
and others often speak – question-beggingly, I think – of con-
stitutional rights as constraints “on the majority,”25 as if gov-
ernment officials somehow could and do perfectly channel 
something we can call majority will.  But of course political ma-
jorities are collections of individuals, each of whom becomes a 
part of that majority only by acting (typically by voting) based 
on her own process of reasoning about how to act; the mythical 
“will of the majority” really is the product of a collection of in-
dividual wills.26  So it will never be the case that some entity 
called “the democratic majority” will engage in a collective 
process of self-conscious reasoning about whether to obey a 
constitutional right or other norm.  Nor is it clear that those 
charged with “representing” the majority always should me-
chanically implement its will, even if that will can accurately 
be identified.27  And, as Ely and Footnote Four remind us, it is 
far from inevitable that government officials always will dis-
charge their duties, whatever those may be, in complete good 
                                                                                                                       
its source.  See U.S. CONST. Amend. XIII.  The Eighteenth Amendment (establishing 
Prohibition) was another exception before it was repealed by the Twenty-First.  See 
U.S. CONST. Amend. XVIII, XXI. 
25 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (2d ed. 1986) (coining the term “counter-
majoritarian difficulty” to describe questions about the democratic legitimacy of 
judicial review); but see RONALD DWORKIN, Introduction:  The Moral Reading and the 
Majoritarian Premise, in FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 1, 15-20 (1996) (questioning the equation of democracy with majorita-
rianism); EISGRUBER, supra note 4, at 49-52 (questioning the assumption that majo-
ritarian political institutions always best “speak for the people”).  
26 For an argument that majorities should not be treated as monolithic entities 
in constitutional theory, see Christopher J. Peters, Persuasion:  A Model of Majori-
tarianism as Adjudication, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 22-25 (2001).  For a valuable and 
nuanced discussion of the centrality of disagreement to democratic legislation and 
some implications for legal theory, see WALDRON, supra note 4, at 21-146. 
27 On the various ways in which government officials might be thought to 
represent democratic majorities, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKEN, THE CONCEPT OF 
REPRESENTATION (1967).  
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faith, and far from certain that in a democracy the bare majori-
ty will always should prevail.28 
For most purposes, then, the relevant legal subject with re-
spect to constitutional rights will be a government official (like 
George) or government institution (like a legislature).  Their 
dilemma will be whether to obey what a constitutional right 
commands in cases where that command conflicts with their 
own best judgment about what to do.  In some instances the 
relevant legal subject will be a citizen – deciding, for example, 
whether to vote for a chief executive or legislator who (in the 
citizen’s judgment) did or did not violate some constitutional 
right.  And often the relevant legal subject will be a judge who 
must decide whether and how to interpret and enforce consti-
tutional rights.  Things stand a bit differently for the judge:  
Typically (though not always) the question for her will be, not 
whether she herself is directly constrained by constitutional 
rights, but whether she should hold that some other govern-
ment actor is so constrained.29  For the judge, then, the ques-
tion of the authority of constitutional rights usually is filtered 
through the question whether she ought to obey other rules 
(secondary rules in the Hartian sense) that direct her to en-
force those rights.30  This is still a question of legal authority – 
just legal authority that is once-removed. 
__________________________________________________________ 
28 See my description of the Ely/Footnote Four approach in Part IV.A, infra. 
29 There are of course potential and actual exceptions:  Constitutional rights may 
purport to directly constrain, not just the democratic majority, but also the conduct 
of judges and other aspects of the judicial process.  Many provisions of the American 
Bill of Rights fit this description.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. AMEND. V (requiring grand-
jury indictment and due process of law and prohibiting double jeopardy and com-
pelled self-incrimination); AMEND. VI (regulating aspects of criminal prosecutions); 
AMEND. VII (guaranteeing trial by jury in certain civil cases); AMEND. VIII (prohibit-
ing cruel and unusual punishments and excessive bail). 
30 Some of these secondary rules will be constitutional in stature.  E.g., U.S. 
CONST. ART VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof, … shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby ….”).  Others will take the form of 
statutes, sub-statutory regulations, or common-law rules:  codes governing the 
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Which brings us back to the central premise of this paper:  
Any plausible defense of constitutional rights must address the 
question of their legal authority.  Institutional designers have 
no good reason to adopt constitutional rights that lack authori-
ty; legal subjects have no (or at least very little) good reason to 
obey constitutional rights that lack authority.31  Given all of 
this, it is not clear why one would endorse any normative justi-
fication of constitutional rights that fails to explain their au-
thority as law. 
III.  SUBSTANTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS AS ACCOUNTS OF LEGAL 
AUTHORITY 
How then do the alternative defenses of constitutional rights 
I mentioned in the Introduction fare as accounts of legal au-
thority?  Some better than others, as it turns out.  In this Part, 
I explore the implicit narratives of legal authority embedded 
within Substantive justifications and find them wanting.  Just 
how unsatisfactory the narrative is, however, depends on 
which version of a Substantive justification is in play.  I have 
been able to identify two principal variants, which I call the 
Simple and the Nuanced versions, and the latter holds up as 
an account of legal authority somewhat better than the former. 
A.  Substantive Justifications:  The Simple Version 
What I will call the Simple Substantive Justification of con-
stitutional rights holds as follows:  Constitutional rights are 
                                                                                                                       
structure of the judiciary and the judicial process, rules of procedure, court rules, 
precedential decisions, norms of professional conduct, and the like. 
31 If a legal subject will be sanctioned in some way for disobeying a constitutional 
right, she may have a good reason to obey it even if it lacks (or if she thinks it lacks) 
authority.  As I suggested in Part II.A.3, however, sanctions must follow authority, 
not the other way around; and so, while it is conceivable that sanctions sometimes 
might justifiably follow from disobedience even to legal norms that lack authority 
(see infra note 14), it is doubtful that such instances will be frequent in a legitimate 
legal system.  Subjects of such a system thus will only infrequently have a coercion-
based reason to obey nonauthoritative legal norms. 
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normatively justified as means of promoting particular states 
of affairs thought to be morally desirable.  The quotation from 
the ACLU website that opens this paper suggests a Simple 
Substantive Justification.  That quotation identifies “free 
speech” as a category of “rights” to which people are “entitled” 
“as human beings,” rights that “naturally” belong to us.32  Pro-
tection of “free speech,” in other words, is thought to be a mo-
rally desirable state of affairs.  And on this view, constitutional 
rights – those embodied in “the First Amendment” and in the 
“entire Bill of Rights” of which it is a part – were “created” as 
ways “to protect” free speech and these other natural rights, 
that is, to promote the morally desirable states of affairs that 
arise when free speech and other natural rights are protected. 
For our purposes, a Simple Substantive Justification like 
this one has two important features.  First, it is substantive in 
the sense that it is concerned ultimately with the moral status 
of results or outcomes – with the states of affairs likely to re-
sult from enforcement of and obedience to constitutional rights, 
and with whether those states of affairs are morally desirable.  
(It is not “procedural,” in that its ultimate concern is not with 
the process by which these states of affairs are achieved.33)  
Second, it is specific in that its substantive focus is quite nar-
row, trained on certain identified outcomes – on “protecting 
free speech,” say, or (a bit more broadly) on “protecting natural 
rights,” rather than on serving the goals of “morality” or “act-
ing morally” as a general matter.  The former component will 
prove troublesome for substantive justifications generally, but 
it is the latter component – specificity – that is most proble-
matic for the Simple Substantive Justification. 
__________________________________________________________ 
32 To be precise, the quotation attributes this sort of natural-law view to “this 
country’s original citizens” as framers and adopters of the Bill of Rights.  But I think 
it is safe to read the quotation as endorsing this understanding.  
33 On this point, see also the discussion supra notes 63-64 and accompanying 
text. 
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Before assessing the Simple Substantive Justification 
against the aspects of legal authority identified in the previous 
Part, I should mention that despite the popularity of that justi-
fication in political and public rhetoric, examples of it are diffi-
cult to find within academic theory.34  I think there is good rea-
son for this, as my discussion should reveal.  But I don’t think 
the scarcity of serious instances of the Simple Substantive Jus-
tification renders it a mere straw man.  So long as that justifi-
cation holds sway over much of the public’s thinking about con-
stitutional rights, as my opening quotes suggest it does, there 
is value in probing it for weakness. 
1.  Operativeness (and Special Force, Noncoerciveness, and 
Salience). – Weakness number one turns out to be the failure of 
the Simple Substantive Justification to account for perhaps the 
most essential feature of legal authority:  its operativeness.  
Operativeness, remember, is the requirement that an authori-
tative legal norm provide a reason for a legal subject to act, not 
just to believe something or to think about how to act.  And on 
the Simple Substantive Justification, constitutional rights fail 
to do this. 
Consider again the hypothetical case of the chief executive, 
George, deciding whether to authorize warrantless electronic 
__________________________________________________________ 
34 A possible exception is Randy Barnett’s defense of the authority of the Ameri-
can Constitution.  Barnett contends that the Constitution is binding (that is, that it 
possesses authority) because it tends to protect a particular understanding of “natu-
ral” rights, namely the libertarian conception that Barnett himself holds and claims 
to share with many of the Framers.  See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 53-86 (2004) (endorsing this under-
standing of “natural” rights and attributing it to the “founding generation”); see also 
id. at 89-115 (espousing an originalist interpretive methodology as the best way to 
implement these rights).  Barnett, typically an astute theorist, is one of the few par-
ticipants in the normative debate about constitutional rights and judicial review to 
directly engage the question of legal authority (which he refers to as the question of 
“legitimacy,” see, e.g., id. at 48); this makes it all the more disappointing that Bar-
nett seems to endorse the Simple Substantive Justification.  I should note that Bar-
nett’s defense of constitutional rights generally – not just the specific set of constitu-
tional rights embodied in the U.S. Constitution – appears to track what I call below 
the Nuanced Substantive Justification.  See infra note 37. 
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surveillance of terrorism suspects.  Suppose that nonlegal rea-
sons (that is, reasons other than those provided by law) A, B, 
and C favor authorizing the surveillance, while nonlegal rea-
sons D, E, and F oppose authorizing it.  A correct assessment of 
the balance of applicable nonlegal reasons will require either a 
decision authorizing the surveillance (call it OS, with the O 
standing for “outcome” and the subscript S standing for “sur-
veillance”) or a decision failing to authorize the surveillance 
(O(-S)).35  Now suppose constitutional right R forbids authoriz-
ing the surveillance.  What effect can R have on the balance of 
moral reasons relevant to George’s decision? 
On the Simple Substantive Justification it can have no effect 
at all.  That justification offers the following reason to obey 
constitutional rights:  Doing so will promote a particular mo-
rally desirable state of affairs.  But surely a legal subject like 
George already has sufficient reason to act in a way that pro-
motes a morally desirable state of affairs, quite apart from the 
law.  If a correct assessment of the balance of applicable non-
legal reasons requires George to choose O(-S), the fact that R al-
so requires O(-S) changes nothing; the requirements of R are en-
tirely redundant of the existing requirements of (nonlegal) mo-
rality. 
By the same token, if the only reason to act provided by R is 
to promote a morally desirable state of affairs, then R provides 
no reason to act in a way that would not do that.  So, if a cor-
rect assessment of the balance of applicable nonlegal reasons 
requires George to choose OS, the fact that R requires him to 
choose O(-S) cannot provide a morally valid reason to act. 
On the Simple Substantive Justification, then, constitutional 
rights supply no reason to act either consistently or inconsis-
tently with the requirements of nonlegal morality.  As Scott 
__________________________________________________________ 
35 For simplicity’s sake I put aside the arguable possibility that a correct assess-
ment of the balance of reasons will permit but not require either action.  This possi-
bility does not materially affect the analysis.  
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Shapiro puts the point, “when [legal] authorities are wrong, 
they cannot have the power to obligate others – when they are 
right, their power to obligate is meaningless. … [T]he institu-
tion of [legal] authority is either pernicious or otiose.”36  The 
existence of the constitutional right adds nothing at all to the 
existing moral calculus; it fails to supply an operative reason 
for action. 
And note that this failure of operativeness implies also a 
failure of several other of the necessary elements of legal au-
thority canvassed in the previous section.  A nonoperative rea-
son (that is, a reason that does not exist, at least not as a rea-
son to act) cannot be a reason that has special normative force, 
akin to a prima facie duty.  Nor can it be a reason whose (non-
existent) operativeness and special force is salient to a reason-
able person ostensibly subject to legal authority. 
This last point, though obvious in the abstract, deserves a bit 
of elucidation, because it is the lack of salience on the Simple 
Substantive Justification that dooms it “on the ground,” so to 
speak.  The teeth of constitutional rights – their practical value 
– is of course their capacity to motivate legal officials, citizens, 
and other relevant actors to do things they otherwise would not 
do; no one cares about constitutional rights or the authority 
they possess when those rights only require what the relevant 
actors would do anyway.  Constitutional rights must be capable 
of causing a decisionmaker like George to act in some way – to 
decline to authorize warrantless surveillance of terrorism sus-
pects, for instance – that he would not have acted absent those 
rights.  And the practical problem with the Simple Substantive 
Justification is that it does not allow constitutional rights to do 
this. 
Suppose George concludes, based on his assessment of the 
applicable nonlegal reasons, that the morally best state of af-
__________________________________________________________ 
36 Shapiro, supra note 6, at 383. 
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fairs includes authorization of the warrantless surveillance.  
The Simple Substantive Justification says to George, in es-
sence, “You must honor the right against unreasonable 
searches (R) because doing so will promote a morally desirable 
state of affairs”; but this is precisely the assertion with which 
George disagrees:  George believes the morally desirable state 
of affairs in that case includes authorization of the surveil-
lance, not refusal to authorize it as R requires.  As a practical 
matter, the justification can offer George no reason to do some-
thing other than what he has already concluded is morally 
right. 
This would be true, moreover, even if George were wrong 
about the morally desirably state of affairs in his case.  
George’s (erroneous) assessment that the morally desirable 
state of affairs includes authorization of the surveillance will 
blind him to the existence of a reason to obey R (namely that 
doing so will promote a morally desirable state of affairs).  R’s 
actually authority, that is, will lack salience with respect to 
George.  And this means that the Simple Substantive Justifica-
tion is dead in the water, not just as a justificatory theory 
about the authority of constitutional rights, but also as a prac-
tical prescription for why constitutional rights matter and de-
serve obedience in the world. 
2.  Source-dependence. – Weakness number two of the Sim-
ple Substantive Justification is its inability to clothe constitu-
tional rights with source-dependence.  A source-dependent 
norm, remember, is one whose authority (to be precise, its 
combination of operativeness, special force, and noncoercive-
ness) derives from its pedigree – from its origin in some special 
person, institution, or process.  If the authority of a norm is 
source-dependent, the same norm would not possess authority 
(at least not the same degree of authority) if it had come from 
some other source.  A constitutional right generated by a na-
tion’s legally sanctioned procedures for creating constitutional 
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law possesses authority that the exact same “constitutional 
right” lacks when it is scribbled by a bar patron on a cocktail 
napkin. 
 Constitutional rights lack source-dependence on the Simple 
Substantive Justification, because any reason to obey them 
does not depend at all on their source.  If George’s obedience to 
R is more likely than his disobedience to promote a morally de-
sirable state of affairs, then this is true regardless of whether R 
was ratified by his nation’s pedigreed constitution-making 
process or merely scribbled on a napkin.  George’s reason to 
obey R has nothing to do with the process that generated R and 
everything to do with the outcome of obeying R.  Even if R 
happens to have some moral authority over George – even, that 
is, if George has some operative reason to obey R – R lacks le-
gal authority over him.  Its normativity, if it exists, resides in 
what R is telling George to do or not to do, not in where R 
comes from. 
B.  Substantive Justifications:  The Nuanced Version 
So the Simple Substantive Justification falls flat as an ac-
count either of the operativeness or of the source-dependence of 
constitutional rights – and thus of their legal authority tout 
court.  What I will call the Nuanced Substantive Justification is 
a considerable improvement over the Simple version (though 
ultimately not improvement enough, I will contend).  The 
Nuanced Substantive Justification holds as follows:  Constitu-
tional rights are justified as means of promoting morally desir-
able states of affairs, whatever they turn out to be.  The quota-
tion from FreedomWorks above might be read to suggest a 
Nuanced Substantive Justification (although it also can be 
read as a Simple version).  The “purpose” of the Constitution, 
according to the quote, is “to protect the natural rights of citi-
zens … from … the overreaching hand of government,” among 
other dangers.  The quotation does not specify any particular 
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“natural rights” deserving of protection (although we might 
think of the very concept of “natural rights” as a specification 
of the content of morality – this is the sense in which the quo-
tation might be read as a Simple account).  Read this way, the 
quotation thus suggests that constitutionally enshrined rights 
are designed to promote some relatively broad spectrum of mo-
rally desirable states of affairs, perhaps even a spectrum that 
is indeterminate and thus incapable of being specified into par-
ticulars.37 
Like the Simple version, the Nuanced Substantive Justifica-
tion is substantive in its ultimate concern with the moral status 
of outcomes, rather than with the status of the procedures used 
to reach outcomes.  Unlike the Simple version, however, the 
Nuanced version does not specify any particular state or states 
of affairs that are morally desirable and thus constitute the ob-
jectives of constitutional rights.  The idea is that enforcing and 
obeying constitutional rights is more likely to get us to some 
morally desirable place – even if we don’t now know, or can’t 
now agree, where that place is – than is failing to enforce and 
obey them. 
This lack of outcome-specificity in the Nuanced Substantive 
Justification means the normative mechanics of the account 
work in a crucially different way than on the Simple version.  
__________________________________________________________ 
37 I noted above (see supra note 34) that while Randy Barnett’s specific justifica-
tion of the American constitution appears to be a Simple Substantive account, his 
general justificatory theory of constitutional law might be understood as a Nuanced 
Substantive account.  Barnett argues that constitutional law possesses “legitimacy” 
– by which he means it “merits the benefit of the doubt and a prima facie duty of 
obedience,” a concept akin to what I call “authority” – if and only if the processes 
that generate and enforce that law “provid[e] adequate assurances that the laws 
[those processes] validat[e] are just.”  BARNETT, supra note 34, at 48.  This approach 
appears to attribute authority to constitutional law insofar as obedience to its com-
mands is – not likely to promote some particular morally desirable outcome – but 
likely to promote whichever outcome turns out to be morally desirable.  That would 
be an example of the Nuanced Substantive Justification that I describe in this sec-
tion.  As Barnett notes, “[o]ne can accept the [general] … conception of legitimacy 
advanced [in his work] without concurring on a particular theory of justice.”  Id. at 
47. 
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The normative bite of the Simple version was its promise to 
promote particular states of affairs; if one thinks a given state 
of affairs is normatively desirable, then for that reason one 
ought to enforce or obey a constitutional right that will pro-
mote that given state of affairs.  The superficial attraction of 
this quasi-logic is evident in the ACLU quotation:  Of course 
free speech is a good thing!  Of course natural rights are moral-
ly desirable!  Who could question constitutional rights that 
would produce such obviously good results? 
It is precisely this illogic, as we’ve seen, that dooms the Sim-
ple Substantive Justification as an account of legal authority.  
But the logic of the Nuanced version is different – less intui-
tively appealing, perhaps, but ultimately more resilient.  The 
idea here is that even if we don’t know for sure which of a 
number of possible states of affairs would be most morally de-
sirable – or if we disagree with each other on that question – 
enforcing and obeying constitutional rights will lead us to the 
right answer, whichever it may be.  As Jeremy Waldron (him-
self no defender of constitutional rights) puts it, constitutional 
rights will help us “get at the truth …, whatever the truth turns 
out to be.”38  The normative bite of the account is its promise, 
not to promote a particular result or outcome, but to promote 
whichever result or outcome happens to be morally best. 
Even from this bare-bones description, we can begin to see 
how the Nuanced Substantive Justification might avoid the 
rocky shoals of legal authority that wrecked its Simple cousin.  
On the Simple version, a constitutional right adds nothing to 
the existing duty of a legal subject to pursue a morally desira-
ble state of affairs.  But on the Nuanced account it might add 
something important.  If the legal subject doesn’t know which 
state of affairs is morally desirable, or can’t agree with other 
decisionmakers on that question, she nonetheless can obey the 
__________________________________________________________ 
38 Waldron, Core Case, supra note 4, at 1373 (emphasis added). 
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constitutional right with the assurance that it will lead her to 
that result, whatever it may be.  The supposed capacity of con-
stitutional rights to overcome moral disagreement or uncer-
tainty might supply the operative reason to act that the 
Nuanced account is missing.  The salience, moreover, that is 
absent from the Simple account seems to emerge on the 
Nuanced version.  If the legal subject wrongly thinks the result 
of obeying constitutional right R would be morally undesirable, 
she might do it anyway – on the ground that she might be 
wrong, and R might be correct, about the morally desirable 
outcome. 
As this point about salience suggests, on the Nuanced Subs-
tantive Justification the operativeness of constitutional rights 
might be (in fact must be) source-dependent as well.  The 
Nuanced version holds that obedience to a constitutional right 
R is more likely than is disobedience to promote morally desir-
able outcomes.  If this is so, it can only be a function of some 
comparative advantage in moral decisionmaking possessed by 
whatever process generated R vis-à-vis the legal subject’s own 
reasoning.  If no such advantage existed – if R were not a more-
reliable indicator of moral desirability than the subject’s own 
judgment – there would be no point in obeying R; the legal sub-
ject should obey her own unalloyed judgment instead.  The sub-
ject’s reason to obey R, then, turns on something about the 
process that generated R:  It turns on R’s source. 
1.  The idea of a comparative decisional advantage. – I want 
to expand a bit on this subject of source-dependence, and par-
ticularly on the necessity that the Nuanced Substantive Justi-
fication persuasively back up the source-dependence it offers.  
It is the essence of source-dependence that the subject have 
some good reason or set of reasons to defer to the person or in-
stitution or procedure that generated a norm.  Here perhaps 
the paradigmatic example is a patient’s deference to the “or-
ders” of her doctor because of the doctor’s vastly greater know-
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ledge of medical matters.  As this example suggests, any ac-
count of authority must supply some persuasive reason or set 
of reasons for this kind of deference.  In a sense, the existence 
of such reasons is the essence of authority; and the right kinds 
of reasons turn out to be very difficult to come by.39 
The reason given by the Nuanced Substantive Justification 
is this:  The process P that generated constitutional right R is 
more likely to produce good decisions about morally desirable 
states of affairs than is the judgment of the legal subject absent 
R.  (Remember here that by “legal subject” we mean a govern-
ment official or citizen acting by virtue of the democratic politi-
cal process, or, sometimes, a judge deciding whether and how 
to constrain that process.)  Any given example of a Nuanced 
Substantive Justification will have to provide a convincing 
narrative of why this reason exists, why it is operative and 
strong enough to constitute a prima facie duty, and thus why 
the condition of source-dependence is met. 
In a moment I will describe perhaps the best-known variety 
of Nuanced Substantive Justification (the Hamiltonian ap-
proach) and explain the account of comparative decisional ad-
vantage it offers.  But first I should note that my goal in this 
paper is not to assess the persuasiveness of that or any other 
particular theory of comparative decisional advantage.  More 
broadly, my goal is not to assess Substantive justifications (or 
for that matter Procedural ones) on their merits.  (That project 
has for a long time been the central preoccupation of academic 
debates about constitutional rights.)40  My goal, rather, is to 
evaluate whether any example of these respective types of jus-
tification (whatever its apparent attractiveness on the merits) 
is capable of providing a coherent account of legal authority.  
__________________________________________________________ 
39 For a couple critical surveys of various categories of reasons that have been of-
fered to justify legal authority, see Shapiro, supra note 6; PETERS, supra note 12, at 
39-66. 
40 See, for example, the sources cited supra note 4.  
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So I will argue below that Nuanced Substantive Justifications 
stumble badly as accounts of legal authority precisely because 
they are centered on the notion of comparative decisional ad-
vantage – quite regardless of whether any particular story 
about comparative decisional advantage seems compelling. 
2.  The classic Hamiltonian account as a type of Nuanced 
Substantive Justification. – A Nuanced Substantive Justifica-
tion thus must explain why the procedures that generate con-
stitutional rights are comparatively better at moral decision-
making, at least about certain matters, than are the subjects of 
constitutional rights – government officials, citizens, and (se-
condarily) judges.  In a system like the American one, any such 
account will have two focal points:  the process of creating gen-
eral constitutional norms (constitutional framing) and the 
process of applying those general norms in specific circums-
tances (constitutional adjudication).41 
In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton sketched a classic 
defense along these lines, outlining themes that continue to re-
sonate in contemporary accounts.  For Hamilton, the framing 
of a constitution was a direct expression of “the power of the 
people,”42 asserted not in the ordinary democratic way – 
through “the major voice of the community”43 – but rather by 
the sort of “solemn and authoritative act” that is capable of 
“annull[ing] or chang[ing] the established form” of govern-
ment.44  Through the lens of the Nuanced Substantive Justifi-
__________________________________________________________ 
41 This dichotomy is a simplification for purposes of illustration.  It is implausi-
ble that there would be a hermetic separation between the creation and the applica-
tion of constitutional norms; in any system featuring common-law elements, the 
application of general norms will itself modify those norms or create new ones.  Nor 
is formal adjudication likely to be the only context in which constitutional norms are 
applied; legislators, other government officials, and voters can be said to “apply” 
constitutional norms whenever they allow their decisionmaking to be guided by 
them. 
42 Federalist No. 78, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 436, 439 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987) (Alexander Hamilton). 
43 Id. at 441. 
44 Id. at 440. 
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cation, the suggestion here – one that also animates contempo-
rary theorist Bruce Ackerman’s influential account of “consti-
tutional moments” at which “higher lawmaking” occurs45 – is 
that there is something special (specially participatory, special-
ly inclusive, specially deliberative) about the process of consti-
tution-framing that gives it a comparative decisionmaking ad-
vantage over the ordinary democratic process, at least with re-
spect to certain types of decisions. 
Hamilton supplemented his account of the Framing with a 
description of constitutional adjudication in which “indepen-
dent” judges, protected by lifetime tenure,46 would act as “bul-
warks of a limited Constitution,” not only to prevent purely 
“legislative encroachments” on constitutional limitations, but 
also “to guard … the rights of individuals from the effects of 
those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influ-
ence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among 
the people themselves.”47  This is an early statement of a famil-
iar idea within American constitutional theory:  that the rela-
tive political insularity of judges enables them to resist the 
push-and-pull of everyday democratic politics and thus to bet-
ter promote those states of affairs that everyday politics tends 
to disregard or compromise (individual and minority “rights,” 
for example, or enduring “values” or fundamental “principles”).  
Hamilton thus begat a tradition later taken up by Alexander 
Bickel, who suggested that “the leisure, the training, and the 
insulation” of judges gives them “certain capacities for dealing 
with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do 
__________________________________________________________ 
45 See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS (1991) [he-
reinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).  Ackerman describes in detail the process of higher law-
making in ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 266-94 (chapter 10). 
46 See Federalist No. 78, supra note 42, at 436-38 (describing the connection be-
tween lifetime tenure and judicial independence). 
47 Id. at 440. 
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not possess,”48 and by neo-Bickelians like Christopher Eisgru-
ber and Lawrence Sager, who point to judicial “disinterested-
ness” (Eisgruber) or “detach[ment]” (Sager) as comparative ad-
vantages over democratic politics in “resolv[ing] issues of prin-
ciple” (Eisgruber) or achieving “conformity with fundamental 
requirements of political justice” (Sager).49 
As I will discuss in Part IV, the Hamiltonian account and its 
recent variants need not be understood as examples of the 
Nuanced Substantive Justification; they might be seen as types 
of Procedural Justification instead.50  But note that if we do 
understand them in Nuanced Substantive terms, these ac-
counts seem to avoid the glaring shortcomings of their Simple 
Substantive cousins.  Hamilton and his heirs defend judicially 
enforced constitutional rights, not as devices to generate speci-
fied (and thus controversial) states of affairs, but rather as 
processes for reaching morally desirable states of affairs, what-
ever those states of affairs turn out to be.  Thus they appear to 
offer a reason for obeying constitutional rights that is opera-
tive, in that it constitutes a new reason to act; source-
dependent, in that its authority depends on the process that 
generated the rights; and salient, in that one might (wrongly) 
disagree with the substance of a constitutional right and still 
have reason to obey it.  That reason is the likelihood that any 
disagreement with the substance of the right is mistaken – 
that the procedures for creating, interpreting, and enforcing 
constitutional rights are comparatively better moral decision-
makers than the unalloyed judgment of the particular citizen, 
judge, or government official. 
__________________________________________________________ 
48 BICKEL, supra note 25, at 25. 
49 See generally EISGRUBER, supra note 4 (quoted text at 57-59); SAGER, supra 
note 4 (quoted text at 74, 19). 
50 See infra Part IV.B.  
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C.  A More-nuanced Look at the Nuanced Version 
In fact, however, the Nuanced Substantive Justification of-
fers a less-persuasive account of legal authority than at first it 
seems.  That justification requires, unavoidably, that legal sub-
jects, in assessing the authority of a constitutional right on any 
given occasion, bring to bear their own moral judgments about 
desirable states of affairs.  Doing so inevitably compromises 
the salience of those rights; ultimately it casts doubt on their 
operativeness as well.51 
1.  Salience (Part I). – Although salience is in some respects 
the hindmost criterion of legal authority – it follows the other 
criteria and in fact cannot exist without them – it is a helpful 
place to begin, for a deficiency of salience is probably the most 
apparent weakness in the Nuanced version’s authority narra-
tive.  The problem, in a nutshell, is that while the Nuanced 
version attenuates the salience problem faced by the Simple 
version, it does not go nearly far enough toward eliminating it 
altogether.  A legal subject’s erroneous disagreement with the 
substance of a legal right remains dangerously likely to un-
dermine her faith in the authority of that right. 
The normative engine of the Nuanced account, remember – 
the source of its operativeness and special force – is a compara-
tive decisional advantage of the constitutional process regard-
ing questions (at least certain questions) of political morality.  
The criterion of salience therefore requires that a reasonable 
legal subject be able to recognize this comparative advantage.  
But a legal subject will have to test the supposed advantage by 
__________________________________________________________ 
51 What I describe in this section as deficiencies in salience and operativeness I 
have described elsewhere as a lack of “content-independence.”  See PETERS, supra 
note 12, at 41-44.  As I suggested in Part II.E above, I now believe that what is 
usually called “content-independence” is in fact the conjunction of the three proper-
ties I have labeled operativeness, source-dependence, and salience.  See supra notes 
16-20 and accompanying text.  I argue below that two of those properties (salience 
and operativeness) are not adequately accounted for on the Nuanced Substantive 
Justification.. 
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subjecting it to her own moral judgments – including her 
judgments about particular cases to which a constitutional 
right applies.  The greater a legal subject’s disagreement with 
the substance of a right, the less likely she is to recognize the 
comparative decisional advantage of the process that produced 
that right; and thus the less likely she is to acknowledge the 
authority of the right. 
To illustrate this phenomenon, consider again the choice 
faced by our hypothetical chief executive, George, who must 
decide whether to obey constitutional right R, which would for-
bid him to authorize warrantless surveillance of terrorism sus-
pects.  On the Nuanced Substantive Justification, George’s rea-
son to obey R depends on a comparison between, on the one 
hand, George’s own decisional capacity absent R (a considera-
ble one, given the vast array of information and opinions at 
George’s disposal), and on the other hand the decisional capaci-
ty of the process, P, that generated R.  If the decisional capaci-
ty of P with respect to the issue at hand is greater than the de-
cisional capacity of George et al., then the Nuanced account 
gives George a reason to obey R, even if he thinks doing so will 
not produce a morally desirable outcome. 
Suppose for the sake of argument that P – which (let us sti-
pulate) combines, in Hamiltonian fashion, an extraordinarily 
participatory and deliberative framing procedure with a politi-
cally independent process of case-by-case adjudication – does in 
fact, by virtue of these qualities, have a comparative decisional 
advantage over George’s own unalloyed judgment.  And let us 
further suppose that as a result, R possesses the qualities of 
operativeness, special force, noncoerciveness, and source-
dependence that are required for legal authority.  One criterion 
of effective authority remains to be established:  That authority 
must be salient, that is, it must be capable of being recognized 
by a reasonable legal subject. 
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So let us suppose that George is in fact a reasonable legal 
subject.  As such, George is unlikely simply to take R’s claim of 
authority for granted.  The stakes are incredibly high, and R is 
telling George not to do something he strongly believes should 
be done in the interest of national security.  The fact that R 
claims legal authority does not make it so – George, after all, 
might find a similar claim scrawled on the proverbial cocktail 
napkin – and surely George has a responsibility to make a rea-
sonable evaluation of R’s supposed authority before blindly de-
ciding to defer to it.52 
How will George, as a reasonable legal subject, assess the 
supposed legal authority of R?  What evidence will be relevant 
to R’s claim of authority?  Some of that evidence will flow from 
the nature of the process, P, that generated R.  So George 
might examine P for signs of comparative decisional advantage 
regarding the kind of moral choice she must now make – per-
haps for the features identified on Hamiltonian accounts, such 
as the special deliberativeness of the framing that originated R 
and the political insularity of the adjudicative process that has 
refined it.53  If George is convinced that these kinds of proce-
__________________________________________________________ 
52 Two quick points in this regard.  First, the strength of the case for probing the 
question of a legal norm’s supposed authority will vary depending on, among other 
things, the cost and the risk of erroneous obedience.  Picture a posted 65-mph speed 
limit.  Few drivers will think it worthwhile to pause and assess whether the speed 
limit’s claimed authority actually exist, in part because the cost of erroneously ac-
knowledging that authority are likely to be low:  Rarely will much harm be done by 
driving a few miles per hour slower than one thinks ideal.  But things may well be 
different when the legal norm in question is a constitutional right claiming the au-
thority to prohibit some seemingly important policy. 
Second, remember that George’s assessment of R’s supposed authority cannot 
take account of possible sanctions for disobeying R; true legal authority must be 
noncoercive.  So, while George may well consider the likelihood of sanctions both 
formal and less so – the possibility of impeachment, the effects on his reelection bid, 
his place in the history books – in deciding whether ultimately to obey R, he cannot 
consider it in deciding whether R actually possesses the legal authority it claims. 
53 None of this is to assert that George will engage in a comprehensive, ab initio 
process of interrogating the grounds of a constitutional right’s supposed authority in 
every case in which he is faced with one.  Even thoughtful legal subjects are likely to 
form their views about the grounds of legal authority over time, based upon the gra-
dual accumulation of disparate bits of evidence, perhaps not entirely self-
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dural elements exist and that they are likely to confer a deci-
sional advantage on P, he will have reason to attribute to R the 
authority it claims. 
Now of course George might be mistaken in his evaluation of 
these procedural questions.  But the possibility of mistaken 
judgment by a legal subject is not, by itself, a threat to an ac-
count of legal authority.  In an imperfect world, no account of 
authority will be immune to some degree of human error on the 
part of legal subjects, even reasonable ones.  The degree of er-
ror affecting any actual system will be largely a matter of con-
tingent sociological facts.  The efficacy of an account of legal 
authority will be jeopardized only if it inevitably generates an 
unacceptable rate of error when applied to any given system.  
Any my argument here is that the Nuanced Substantive Justi-
fication inevitably generates an unacceptably high rate of er-
ror, even when applied to a legal system consisting entirely of 
reasonable legal subjects. 
This problem arises because a reasonable legal subject like 
George almost certainly would go beyond an evaluation of the 
purely procedural aspects of P.  In assessing the question of P’s 
supposed comparative advantage, surely George will want to 
know, not just what P looks like, but also what P has done – 
what results or outcomes or states of affairs have resulted in 
the past from the rights generated by P.  The supposed point of 
obeying a constitutional right like R, after all, is P’s superior 
capacity to promote morally good states of affairs.  Whether the 
states of affairs promoted by P in the past have in fact been 
morally good thus is an obviously material question. 
So George will look to the past results of deferring to rights 
generated by P.  But of course George cannot magically assess 
those results with god-like omniscient judgment.  His evalua-
                                                                                                                       
consciously.  But it is useful as an illustration to imagine our hypothetical chief ex-
ecutive performing this inquiry more or less from scratch in this particular instance. 
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tion of the moral quality of these results (which of them were 
better, which were worse, whether on the whole the results 
were good or bad) will be the product of his own unalloyed 
moral reasoning – the same moral reasoning that, on the 
Nuanced account, is by hypothesis inferior to the judgment 
embodied in P.  In other words, George will be using his own 
moral judgment to determine, in part at least, whether his own 
moral judgment is inferior to that of P. 
Now we can begin to discern the problematic boot-strapping 
attempted by the Nuanced account of legal authority.  On that 
account, the legal authority of constitutional rights is premised 
on the comparative decisional advantage of the process (P) for 
producing those rights vis-à-vis the moral judgments of those 
who, like George, supposedly are bound by them.  But legal 
subjects like George cannot perceive this authority without 
wielding their own (by hypothesis inferior) moral judgments.  
Thus the effectiveness of the Nuanced account is imperiled by 
the very phenomenon the account seeks to avoid. 
Again, the problem here is not simply that legal subjects like 
George might make mistakes in deciding whether a constitu-
tional right is authoritative.  The problem is that the Nuanced 
account is premised on the inevitability of precisely this sort of 
mistake.  The whole point of constitutional rights, on that justi-
fication, is to remove certain issues from the (by hypothesis in-
ferior) moral judgment of legal subjects and decide them by the 
(by hypothesis superior) moral judgment of the constitutional 
process.  The relative inferiority of the legal subject’s judgment 
is at the foundation of the account.  So the same phenomenon 
that gives constitutional rights their authority (on the Nuanced 
account) also threatens the efficacy of that authority by reduc-
ing the capacity of legal subjects to recognize it. 
And note what I am not arguing here.  I am not claiming 
that the Nuanced Substantive Justification’s account of legal 
authority is faulty because legal subjects might erroneously 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL AUTHORITY 43 
disobey constitutional rights.  That possibility is, I believe, en-
demic to (plausible) accounts of legal authority, whatever their 
particulars.  Barring an absolutist account of legal authority – 
one holding that valid law imposes an absolute duty of ob-
edience, trumping all nonlegal considerations54 – there will al-
ways be a danger that legal subjects will undervalue the claims 
of legal authority, overvalue the competing considerations, and 
thus erroneously disobey even authoritative law.  (Indeed this 
risk probably is inevitable even on an absolutist account, as 
any given legal subject might erroneously deny her absolute 
duty to obey the law.)  What is problematic about the Nuanced 
account, rather, is the endemic likelihood that even reasonable 
legal subjects will erroneously deny the legal authority of con-
stitutional rights – thus entirely vitiating what should be a 
prima facie duty to act as the law requires (and thereby greatly 
increasing the corresponding risk of erroneous disobedience of 
the law). 
To sum up so far, then:  The Nuanced Substantive Justifica-
tion relies on the premise that the reasonable legal subject’s 
unalloyed moral judgment is inferior to the judgment embodied 
in the constitutional process.  But the reasonable legal subject 
will test this claim by assessing the past results of that process 
using his own (inferior) moral judgment.  If his assessment is 
erroneous – as the account stipulates it is likely to be – then 
his evaluation of the authority of constitutional rights might be 
erroneous as well.  The salience, and thus the effective authori-
ty, of constitutional rights will be undermined by the very 
problem the Nuanced Substantive Justification is supposed to 
avoid. 
But the problem gets worse. 
2.  Salience (Part II). – The problem gets worse because, in 
assessing P’s claim to a comparative decisional advantage, a 
__________________________________________________________ 
54 I argue against such an absolutist account in PETERS, supra note 12, at 33-36, 
44-47. 
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reasonable legal subject like George is unlikely to be satisfied 
with looking at the past results of P.  Those results will be re-
levant, to be sure – they will suggest whether P really is com-
petent at generating morally desirable results – but they are 
likely to be relevant by analogy at best.  Few prior cases will be 
on all fours with the case George now faces, and so P’s perfor-
mance in those past instances – to be precise, the states of af-
fairs resulting from obedience to the rights generated by P – 
will be suggestive but probably not conclusive evidence of P’s 
likely performance in the case at hand.  Surely the most direct 
evidence on that question is in fact the state of affairs likely to 
result from obedience to R (as a product of P) in the case at 
hand. 
So George will ask what state of affairs is likely to result 
from obedience to R in his case; and he will ask whether that 
state of affairs is morally desirable.  And of course he can only 
answer these questions through the filter of his own fallible 
moral judgment.  George, then, might turn out to be wrong in 
his determination of whether obeying R in his case will pro-
mote a morally desirable state of affairs.  (Indeed, it is precise-
ly this possibility that justifies the authority of constitutional 
rights in the first place on the Nuanced Substantive account.)  
Remember, too, that George is in this fix to begin with because 
his own moral judgment, pre-R, is counseling him to do some-
thing (to authorize the surveillance) that R purports to forbid.  
So it is quite likely indeed that George will conclude, erro-
neously, that obeying R will not promote a morally desirable 
state of affairs in this particular case.  And this will serve as 
powerful evidence – more powerful, perhaps, than P’s perfor-
mance in prior cases – that the claim of comparative decisional 
advantage embodied in R is vacuous, and thus that R lacks au-
thority over George. 
The threat to salience revealed by this example is, I think, 
especially dangerous.  It arises from the legal subject’s judg-
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ment about morally desirable results in the particular case he 
faces, and it is precisely this phenomenon – the subject’s exer-
cise of his (possibly erroneous) judgment in the particular case 
– that justifies constitutional rights on the Nuanced account.  
And because of the obvious, perhaps overriding materiality of 
this particular bit of evidence (evidence regarding the result in 
the case at hand) to the question of comparative decisional ad-
vantage in that case, the legal subject seems likely to give it 
special (perhaps overriding) weight in his assessment of that 
question.  It also seems likely that the stronger the subject’s 
disagreement with the right in that case – the less morally de-
sirable the subject thinks the result of obeying the right will be 
– the weaker the right’s claim to authority will become in the 
subject’s view.  A process that gets it so wrong in such an im-
portant case can hardly be reliable generally on moral matters.  
Or so the legal subject seems dangerously likely to conclude. 
We thus face the following difficulty on the Nuanced ac-
count:  The very danger that account seeks to avoid (the erro-
neous moral judgment of legal subjects in particular cases) is in 
fact a threat to the authority of constitutional rights on that 
account, reducing the likelihood that those rights will be suffi-
cient to meet the danger.  A legal subject has reason to obey a 
constitutional right with which he disagrees, but his reason 
might be merely theoretical – overwhelmed by the fact of his 
disagreement.  The authority of constitutional rights, on the 
Nuanced account, threatens to become irrelevant. 
And in fact the problem gets worse still. 
3.  The Aristotelian Difficulty (Part I). – The problem gets 
worse still because of a well-known flaw in rules, one famously 
noticed by Aristotle.  The flaw manifests itself at two levels on 
the Nuanced Substantive Justification.  It afflicts particular 
constitutional rights themselves where those rights take the 
form of a Hartian primary rule – as is almost always the case 
in actual constitutional practice.  More fundamentally, it af-
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flicts the secondary rule posited by the Nuanced account, 
namely that constitutional rights should be treated as authori-
tative because they derive from a decisionally advantaged pro-
cedure.  One result is further attenuation of the salience re-
quired for legal authority.  An even more devastating result is 
a breakdown in the very operativeness of constitutional rights. 
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle shared the following 
insight about rules: 
[A]ll law is universal but about some things it is not possible 
to make a universal statement which shall be correct.  In those 
cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but 
not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, 
thought it is not ignorant of the possibility of error.  And it is 
none the less correct; for the error is not in the law nor in the 
legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of 
practical affairs is of this kind from the start.55 
Aristotle’s insight is simply that rules often have exceptions – 
cases in which, although a rule applies, its application is not 
justified by whatever justifies the rule.  In modern parlance, 
the problem is that rules typically are overinclusive:56  They 
cover cases in which their justification does not exist or is over-
come by other considerations.  A rule prohibiting the consump-
tion of alcohol by people under age 21 will apply to many tee-
nagers who are mature enough to drink responsibly; a rule 
prohibiting driving faster than 65 miles per hour will apply in 
many circumstances in which a greater speed is appropriate, 
even necessary; and so on.57  We might refer to this pervasive 
imperfection of rules as the Aristotelian Difficulty. 
__________________________________________________________ 
55 ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, book 
V, at 1020 (W.D. Ross trans., Richard McKeon ed., 1941). 
56 See the influential discussion in Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The 
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).  
REV. 341 (1949) 
57 I survey the causal explanations for the imperfection of rules in PETERS, supra 
note 12, at 2-7. 
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This Aristotelian Difficulty infects the Nuanced Substantive 
Justification of constitutional rights in two ways.  Consider 
first the fact that constitutional rights typically take the form 
of Hartian primary rules.  In our running hypothetical, R will 
not be an ad hoc decree directed at the particular circums-
tances George happens to face, but rather a general rule de-
rived from the language of a canonical text and refined over 
many years by particular applications in judicial decisions and 
other instances.  The rule embodied in R, moreover, will be 
what Hart called a primary rule:  It will (purport to) bind 
George directly, in his capacity as a legal subject – to require 
him to act or refrain from acting in a certain way.58 
As a primary rule, R will be justified by considerations like 
the importance of personal privacy, the avoidance of govern-
ment tyranny, and the like, and it will appropriately apply in 
any case in which these considerations outweigh any counter-
vailing ones (such as law enforcement or national security).  
But, as Aristotle reminds us, R may have exceptions:  cases in 
which it applies but is not justified.  There may be some cases 
in which R forbids a search, for example, where that search 
would in fact promote law enforcement or protect national se-
curity with comparatively little cost to personal privacy or risk 
of government tyranny.  In such cases, the “universal state-
ment” embodied in the rule would not be correct. 
Now a problem for the Nuanced Substantive Justification is 
this:  A legal subject like George will, again, have to exercise 
his own unalloyed moral judgment to determine whether his 
case is an exception to the general rule embodied in R.  Seen in 
Aristotelian terms, this problem is subtly different from the 
one discussed above – the phenomenon of George’s use of his 
moral judgment about this case to assess the authority of R, or 
__________________________________________________________ 
58 Recall my description of the distinction between Hartian primary and second-
ary rules and its relevance to the authority of constitutional rights in Part II.F.  See 
supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text. 
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perhaps of all constitutional rights, more generally.  Faced 
with the Aristotelian Difficulty, George will employ his own 
moral judgment, not simply to identify evidence of the general 
reliability of P (the process that produced R), but also to de-
termine whether this particular case is an exception to R, quite 
regardless of whether P on the whole is reliable.  George’s dis-
agreement with R in this case – his belief that obeying R would 
not promote a morally desirable result – might be enough to 
convince him that R lacks authority in this case, even if it is 
not enough to convince him that R (as a product of P) lacks au-
thority generally. 
This point is a bit conceptually tricky, so allow me to illu-
strate with a more-detailed description of George’s reasoning.  
As we’ve seen, George will have to determine for himself 
whether R really possesses legal authority in the circums-
tances he faces.  So George will look at a number of bits of evi-
dence relevant to this question.  First, George will look at the 
procedural features of the process that generated R, process P, 
to determine whether they seem like the kind of procedures ca-
pable of producing a comparative decisional advantage.  Second 
(and problematically, as we’ve seen), George will look at past 
results generated by P to determine whether those results 
evince a capacity to promote morally desirable states of affairs.  
And third (even more problematically), George will look at the 
likely result of obeying R in this particular case, again to de-
termine whether that likely result supports the proposition 
that P has a comparative decisional advantage. 
Suppose that after working through this reasoning, George 
remains persuaded (perhaps only by a hair) that P has a com-
parative decisional advantage, and thus that R possesses legal 
authority as a product of P.59  Now, however, George will make 
__________________________________________________________ 
59 It is not out of the question that George would conclude this, despite all the 
obstacles to his doing so.  George’s moral assessment of P’s performance in past cas-
es, and of the likely results of obeying R in this case, might be influenced by the 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL AUTHORITY 49 
an additional inquiry in response to the Aristotelian Difficulty:  
He will ask whether, despite its general legal authority, R lacks 
legal authority in this instance because this instance is an ex-
ception to R.  And George might well conclude that the answer 
is yes, even though R is the product of a process that, generally 
speaking, possesses a comparative decisional advantage – and 
even though R therefore possesses authority in the majority of 
instances.  
Why might he (reasonably) conclude this?  Consider the rela-
tive decisionmaking posture of George in relation to P, the 
process that created R.  R is a general rule created over time by 
a long string of decisionmakers, none of whom are likely to 
have considered the particular facts of George’s case in making 
the rule.  The framers of the textual provision from which R 
derives probably did not have George’s particular case in mind 
– indeed it may have been impossible for them to have had it in 
mind, if they did their work many years earlier, in a very dif-
ferent world that did not include phenomena like electronic 
surveillance and international terrorism.  And while the con-
tent of R will have been refined post-framing by case-by-case 
application, only if one of those cases happens to have been vir-
tually identical to George’s case (an unlikely scenario) will it be 
possible to say that R’s authors had that case in mind when 
they formed their rule.  George may well conclude, in other 
words, that P, however reliable it may be as a general matter, 
did not consider his particular case in creating R. 
George also will recognize, on the other hand, that there is a 
decisionmaker capable of fully considering the particular case 
                                                                                                                       
facts that those results have been generated by P.  If George starts from a belief that 
P generally is reliable, he might be more inclined to view the results of P as morally 
desirable than he would have been without this belief.  This inclination itself might 
sweeten his assessment of those results, tempering the countervailing considera-
tions and increasing the likelihood that he will agree with them in substance.  It 
might even cause him to rethink his initial belief that obedience to R in his case 
would not produce a morally desirable outcome.  P and R, in other words, might pro-
vide an epistemic reason for George to alter his moral beliefs. 
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he now faces:  namely George himself.  George’s capacity to 
take specific account of his particular circumstances (George 
reasonably might think) constitutes a comparative decisional 
advantage over P, which lacks that capacity – perhaps a very 
significant comparative advantage.  Unlike P, after all, George 
is not handicapped by an inability to foresee the particular sit-
uation he now faces.  Indeed, George might reasonably con-
clude that whatever usual properties give P a comparative de-
cisional advantage over George are outweighed, in this in-
stance, by George’s uniquely particularistic perspective. 
Based on this reasoning, George, as a reasonable legal sub-
ject, might reasonably reject R’s claim to legal authority over 
him in his particular case.  He might do so not (or not solely) on 
the ground that his disagreement with R in this case under-
mines R’s general claim to legal authority, but rather on the 
ground that his disagreement with R in this case undermines 
R’s specific claim to legal authority in this case. 
 Now it will, again, always be a risk of theories of legal au-
thority that a legal subject will decide, wrongly, to disobey a 
supposedly authoritative norm in any particular case.  But the 
phenomenon I’m describing here is special in two senses.  First, 
the risk is (again) not simply that George will decide to disobey 
R, but rather that George will decide that R lacks authority 
over him in this case (and thus that the strongest reason for 
obedience to R is entirely vitiated).  George’s conclusion that 
his case is an exception to R is a conclusion that R should not 
apply in this case – that R lacks authority in that case – not a 
conclusion that R applies but nonetheless should be disobeyed. 
Second, the risk of erroneous denial of R’s authority is, 
again, endemic rather than merely happenstance on the 
Nuanced Substantive Justification.  The whole point of that 
justification, remember, is to avoid subjecting certain impor-
tant moral decisions to the fallible judgment of the legal sub-
ject; the subject’s comparative moral fallibility is a premise of 
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the account.  But thanks to the Aristotelian Difficulty, the 
question of a constitutional right’s authority will, in any given 
case, be subjected as a practical matter to precisely the fallible 
judgment the account is supposed to avoid. 
Note too that the Aristotelian threat to legal authority is 
even greater than the threat described in the previous two sec-
tions.  For one thing, the Aristotelian threat exists without re-
gard to the comparative decisional advantage of the constitu-
tional process generally or to evidence regarding that advan-
tage.  George might believe that every single past instance of 
obeying R, even of obeying the products of P more generally, 
has produced a morally desirable state of affairs, and still rea-
sonably conclude that this case is an exception to R.  George 
might even think that his disagreement with R in this instance 
– his belief that obeying R would not promote a desirable result 
– is insufficient to disprove R’s authority generally, and still 
(reasonably) conclude that this case, again, is an exception to 
R.  The Aristotelian threat thus is likely to be especially persis-
tent. 
And – importantly – the Aristotelian Difficulty threatens not 
just the salience of constitutional rights, but also their opera-
tiveness.  We have been indulging the assumption thus far that 
George’s assessment of the authority of R is erroneous.  But the 
Aristotelian Difficulty raises the troubling possibility that a 
constitutional right may in fact lack authority in any given 
case.  Suppose George is correct that P did not actually consid-
er his specific facts in fashioning R:  Neither the framers of the 
underlying provision nor its subsequent interpreters envi-
sioned those circumstances (perhaps because they could not 
have envisioned them).  And suppose George is therefore cor-
rect in concluding that he (with all his resources) is in fact a 
better decisionmaker in this instance than the process that 
generated R.  George’s decision to reject R’s authority then 
would not reflect a lack of salience; it would reflect an actual 
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lack of authority (to be precise, a failure to generate an opera-
tive reason for George to act).  R would lack authority in 
George’s case because the reason justifying that authority – the 
comparative decisional advantage of the process that created R 
– simply would not apply. 
Of course, the failure of legal authority in any given instance 
need not entail the wholesale failure of an account of legal au-
thority.  It is unlikely that any general account of authority 
could meet such a perfectionist standard.  As it happens, 
though, the particular normative grounding of the Nuanced 
Substantive Justification makes it especially susceptible to the 
challenge posed by the Aristotelian Difficulty. 
4.  The Aristotelian Difficulty (Part II). – To appreciate the 
extent of the problem, consider the fact that any given consti-
tutional right is more than just a primary rule governing the 
conduct of government officials and voters; it also is the prod-
uct of a secondary rule conferring authority upon the primary 
rule.  Constitutional right R possesses authority (if at all) only 
because a secondary rule in the applicable jurisdiction says so.  
And here is the rub:  The Aristotelian Difficulty applies not 
just to R as a primary rule, but also to this secondary rule go-
verning the authority of R as a primary rule.  Aristotle tells us 
that there may be exceptions to the secondary rule conferring 
R’s authority – cases in which the rule applies but is not justi-
fied by whatever considerations justify the rule more generally. 
On the Nuanced Substantive Justification, the secondary 
rule that confers primary authority upon R is justified by com-
parative decisional advantage:  R has authority if (and only if) 
the process P that generated R has a comparative decisional 
advantage over the legal subject’s unalloyed moral reasoning.60  
We have seen that this justification might not apply in some 
__________________________________________________________ 
60 “If and only if,” that is, so far as the justification supplied by the Nuanced ac-
count is concerned.  It is of course possible that R could lack authority on the 
Nuanced account but possess it by some other means. 
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particular cases.  What that means is that any given case 
might be an exception to the secondary rule conferring authori-
ty on R; in any given case in which R applies, P might not in 
fact possess a comparative decisional advantage over the legal 
subject himself, and thus R might not have authority at all. 
Again, the failure of legal authority in some cases need not 
entail the general failure of a theory of legal authority.  But the 
trouble for the Nuanced Substantive Justification is that it 
hinges entirely on the existence of a comparative decisional ad-
vantage.  If that advantage is missing from any given case, 
then the Justification does not hold in that case – the constitu-
tional right in question simply lacks authority in that particu-
lar instance.  And there is every reason to believe that Aristote-
lian exceptions will be quite common on the Nuanced Substan-
tive Justification.  Constitutional rights typically are expressed 
by means of a relatively archaic text, in very open-textured 
language, which is interpreted relatively infrequently by courts 
responding to their own particular circumstances and doing so 
by means of their own open-textured language.  Under these 
conditions, it will be relatively unusual for the constitutional 
process to have taken specific account of the exact circums-
tances that the legal subject faces in any particular instance 
(or even of loosely analogous circumstances).  To the extent the 
constitutional process has not considered the precise facts at 
hand, its claim of a comparative decisional advantage vis-à-vis 
the legal subject becomes correspondingly less plausible.  Thus 
there will be a strong likelihood that any given case is an ex-
ception to the secondary rule conferring authority on constitu-
tional rights.61 
__________________________________________________________ 
61 Joseph Raz makes a similar point: 
To assume that expertise gives lawmakers timeless authority is to assume 
that either no advance in knowledge in the relevant area or no advance in 
its spread is likely, or both.  Such advances would negate the expertise of 
the old lawmakers relative to new experts (new advances in knowledge) or 
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It seems probable, then, that gaps in the actual (and not just 
in the perceived) authority of constitutional rights will be en-
demic on the Nuanced account.  The account depends on a 
comparative advantage that, the Aristotelian Difficulty sug-
gests, will be lacking in many, perhaps even most cases to 
which constitutional rights apply.  And so in addition to the 
high cumulative risk that even reasonable legal subjects will 
wrongly deny the authority of constitutional rights, we must 
add a high risk that those rights will in fact lack authority. 
 
* * * 
Here, then, is where we stand so far.  The Nuanced Substan-
tive Justification runs into trouble, as an account of legal au-
thority, because it depends on the general validity of the propo-
sition that constitutional processes have a comparative deci-
sional advantage over constitutional subjects.  That proposition 
produces internal tension in the account, because it suggests 
that legal subjects frequently (indeed endemically) will err in 
their assessments of constitutional authority.  And its generali-
ty seems difficult if not impossible to sustain in the face of the 
Aristotelian Difficulty, which gives strong reason for skeptic-
ism that the supposed comparative advantage actually will ex-
ist in very many cases. 
In other words, the Nuanced Substantive Justification, while 
an improvement over its Simple cousin, nonetheless leaves 
much to be desired as an account of the legal authority of con-
stitutional rights. 
                                                                                                                       
relative to the population at large (the spread of knowledge).  Either would 
denude them of legitimate authority insofar as it is based on expertise. 
Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions:  Some Prelimi-
naries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:  PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 168 (Larry Alex-
ander, ed. 1998). 
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IV.  PROCEDURAL JUSTIFICATIONS AS ACCOUNTS OF LEGAL 
AUTHORITY (WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO “REPRESENTATION-
REINFORCEMENT”) 
The central problem with Substantive justifications of con-
stitutional rights, when it comes to legal authority, is their de-
pendence on the moral desirability of the states of affairs that 
result from obeying rights.  If obedience would not produce a 
morally good result, the reason for obedience is undermined; 
and so a subject’s disagreement with the result erodes her faith 
in the right’s authority. 
Procedural justifications can escape this problem by resting 
the authority of constitutional rights, not on their capacity to 
generate morally desirable states of affairs, but rather on their 
capacity to avoid or resolve disputes about which states of af-
fairs are morally desirable.  Writ large, Procedural justifica-
tions hold as follows:  Constitutional rights are normatively 
justified as means of avoiding, resolving, or mitigating certain 
types of disagreements about which outcomes are morally best. 
Below I examine Procedural justifications in more detail 
through the lens of their best-known exemplar, the “represen-
tation-reinforcement” approach of John Hart Ely and Carolene 
Products Footnote Four (to which I will refer as the Represen-
tation-Reinforcement Justification).  Note first, however, the 
basic mechanics by which Procedural justifications might avoid 
the self-eroding account of authority offered by their Substan-
tive rivals.  The core problem with Substantive accounts is that 
moral disagreement with the outcome of obeying a right serves 
as a reason, perhaps quite a strong one, not just to disobey the 
right, but to deny its authority altogether.  But on Procedural 
accounts, disagreement with outcomes need not serve as a rea-
son to deny the authority of constitutional rights.  One might 
believe the outcome of obeying a right will be morally atro-
cious, and still have (good) reason to obey the right – namely 
that doing so will avoid, resolve, or mitigate a dispute.  The 
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central insight goes back at least to Hobbes:62  Peacefully set-
tling disputes can be a powerful reason to obey the law even 
when one disagrees strongly with what the law commands. 
To illustrate this idea briefly, consider again our hypotheti-
cal chief executive, George.  Assume George believes that the 
substantive outcome of obeying constitutional right R – refus-
ing to authorize the warrantless surveillance – is less morally 
desirable than the alternative.  But suppose George also be-
lieves that obeying R would promote or preserve the settlement 
of an important and costly dispute – namely a disagreement 
over the proper balance between national security and civil li-
berties in cases like these – and that disobeying R would pre-
vent or destroy that settlement.  George now has a reason to 
obey R despite his disagreement with the substantive result of 
doing so; his reason is the desirability of resolving or avoiding 
the dispute that R has settled or may settle. 
I will explore these conceptual mechanics more fully below, 
but for now let me highlight three important aspects of the ba-
sic account of legal authority that Procedural justifications em-
body.  The first involves some clarification of the notion of an 
“outcome” or “result” or “state of affairs” produced by obedience 
to a constitutional right.  To resolve a dispute, or to avoid or 
mitigate a dispute or preserve an existing resolution of it, may 
of course be an “outcome” of obeying a right; and in this sense 
Procedural justifications depend on “outcomes” just as Subs-
tantive justifications do.  But Procedural and Substantive justi-
fications nonetheless depend on very different sorts of out-
comes.  Substantive justifications depend on the outcome that 
follows from the content (or substance) of the right in ques-
tion;63 the important thing, on a Substantive account, is what 
__________________________________________________________ 
62 See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651).  
For a description of Hobbes’s general theory of legal authority as a procedural or 
“dispute-resolution” account, see PETERS, supra note 12, at 57-61.  
63 In this sense the familiar terminology of “content-independence” captures 
something important about the concept of legal authority, despite being misleading 
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the right tells people to do (e.g., to refrain from authorizing 
warrantless surveillance).  It is that thing – that particular 
“outcome” or “result” or “state of affairs” – whose moral status 
matters on Substantive justifications.  By contrast, Procedural 
justifications depend on the outcome that follows from the exis-
tence of the right in question; the important thing, on a Proce-
dural account, is that the right tells people to do something.  It 
is the outcome of obeying the right, whatever it tells one to do – 
that is, the resolution or avoidance of a dispute that occurs 
when the right is obeyed – whose moral status matters on the 
Procedural account.  Unfortunately language fails us here; 
there is no pithy way to signal the distinction between these 
two senses of “outcomes.”64  So I will continue to use the termi-
nology of “outcomes” or “results” or “states of affairs” to de-
scribe the lynchpin of Substantive justifications, and the ter-
minology of “dispute-resolution,” “dispute-avoidance,” and the 
like to describe the crux of Procedural justifications. 
Second, it is important to focus here on precisely what I am 
claiming:  that Procedural accounts can avoid the internal ten-
sions in the accounts of legal authority offered by Substantive 
justifications.  I am not claiming that Procedural accounts can 
foreclose justified disobedience of constitutional rights; as I 
have suggested several times already, I very much doubt that 
any account of legal authority can do this.65  (Of course Proce-
dural accounts will have be prove capable of generating a 
strong enough reason for obedience to constitute a prima facie 
duty or something close to it.)  Nor am I claiming that Proce-
                                                                                                                       
in the ways I suggest above.  See supra note 7; supra notes 16-20 and accompanying 
text.  A legal norm whose supposed authority depends on its content – on the moral 
status of what it commands – is, for that reason, unlikely to be effectively authorita-
tive, for the reasons discussed in Part III.  “Content-independence” – a duty of ob-
edience resting on something other than the content of a legal norm – thus is a 
shorthand way to describe a set of necessary components of legal authority. 
64 At least I have not been able to identify one, although I am of course open to 
suggestions. 
65 See supra note 12; supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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dural accounts can prevent erroneous disobedience of constitu-
tional rights, which will (again) be a risk of any account of legal 
authority intended to apply to actual human beings.  (But Pro-
cedural accounts – of course – will have to avoid the sort of self-
fulfilling lack of salience that characterizes their Substantive 
rivals.)  I am claiming only that Procedural justifications can 
fare better as coherent accounts of legal authority than Subs-
tantive justifications can. 
Third, just as Substantive justifications bear the burden of 
persuasively explaining why the results of obeying constitu-
tional rights are likely to be morally superior to the results of 
disobeying them, Procedural justifications bear the burden of 
persuasively explaining why obedience of constitutional rights 
is more likely than is disobedience to avoid, resolve, or mitigate 
a dispute.  Below I will describe the particular explanation in 
this regard offered by the Representation-Reinforcement ver-
sion of the Procedural justification.  But I will not defend the 
persuasiveness of that justification on its merits (just as I did 
not assess the persuasiveness on its merits of the Hamiltonian 
version of the Substantive justification).  Instead I will use Re-
presentation-Reinforcement to illustrate how a Procedural ac-
count, whatever its merits in other respects, might avoid the 
conceptual pitfalls of Substantive accounts. 
A.  Representation-Reinforcement as a Procedural Justification 
In Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely mounted an ar-
gument against the use of judicial review to “discover funda-
mental values” – moral truths that, in the revealingly insou-
ciant words of Ely’s chief target Alexander Bickel, “qualify as 
sufficiently important or fundamental or whathaveyou to be 
vindicated by the Court against … values affirmed by legisla-
tive acts.”66  Ely rejected such a quest as antidemocratic, de-
__________________________________________________________ 
66 ELY, supra note 3, at 43 (quoting BICKEL, supra note 25, at 55). 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL AUTHORITY 59 
volving as it inevitably does (in Ely’s view) to the imposition of 
whichever “values” a given majority of Supreme Court Justice 
happen to think are “fundamental.”67  Persistent doubts about 
the legitimacy of judicial review – including Bickel’s own, near 
the end of his life68 – often can be traced, Ely contended, to the 
irreconcilable tension between this fundamental-values ap-
proach and the realities of moral indeterminacy and moral dis-
agreement.  The problem, Ely argued, was that fundamental-
values theorists were looking for judicial-review justifications 
in all the wrong places.  “No answer is what the wrong ques-
tion begets,” Ely scolded, flinging Bickel’s own admonishment 
back at him.69 
Ely addressed his critique to an audience of institutional de-
signers, more or less, not of legal subjects; he did not consider 
its implications for the problem of legal authority.  But his ar-
gument can be recast in authority-centered terms, as an attack 
on Substantive justifications of constitutional rights.  A defense 
of judicially enforced rights as necessary to promote “funda-
mental values” – a form of Substantive justification – will run 
smack into the fact of disagreement about what those values 
are, how best to promote them, and indeed whether they exist 
at all.  Legal subjects who disagree with the particular concep-
tion of “values” adopted by the Court in interpreting and apply-
ing constitutional rights will (on on a fundamental-values ap-
proach) have little reason to honor those decisions.  Their quest 
for constitutional authority, then – for reasons to obey constitu-
tional rights – will turn up “no answer.” 
Ely’s critique thus paralleled (quite self-consciously) the evo-
lution of the Court’s own thinking about rights between, rough-
__________________________________________________________ 
67 See id. at 43-72. 
68 Ely points to Bickel’s last two books, including the posthumously published 
The Morality of Consent, as evidence of Bickel’s doubts.  See id. at 71-72 (citing 
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 177 (1970, and 
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 3-5 (1975)). 
69 Id. at 43 (quoting BICKEL, supra note 25, at 103); see also id. at 72. 
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ly, its decision in Lochner v. New York70 and its New-Deal rejec-
tion of “Lochnerism.”  The Lochner Court’s assertion of “the 
right to purchase and to sell labor” as a sort of a priori truth71 
can be understood as an example of the Substantive approach – 
a confidence in the Court’s mandate to pursue moral truths 
through the vehicle of constitutional rights.  The eventual cri-
sis of public faith in the Court’s legitimacy, crystallized in 
FDR’s “Court-packing” plan,72 might be interpreted as an ero-
sion in the perceived authority of a Court so insistent on pur-
suing a particular, contested vision of political morality.  And 
the Court’s adoption, mid-New Deal, of a “hands-off” rational-
basis approach to “substantive” due process73 might be seen as 
belated acknowledgement of the Substantive justification’s fat-
al flaws as an account of constitutional authority. 
Rather than reject the idea of judicially enforced constitu-
tional rights altogether, the New Deal Court, and later Ely in 
considerably more detail, offered an alternative to the Substan-
tive justification.  Their “Representation-Reinforcement” ap-
proach74 justifies constitutional rights, not as paths to the best 
substantive outcomes, but as means of resolving disputes about 
__________________________________________________________ 
70 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
71 See id. at 53-54. 
72 There are of course many accounts of the events surrounding the Court-
packing proposal.  For two useful ones of recent vintage, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE 
WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINIONS HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT 
AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 212-36 (2009), and NOAH FELDMAN, 
SCORPIONS:  THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 
103-14 (2010). 
73 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938): 
[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not 
to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made 
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the as-
sumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators. 
74 Ely used the term “representation reinforcement” to describe the approach (see 
ELY, supra note 3, at 87-88), and that has become the standard label for it.  See, e.g., 
Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1237 
(2005) (using the term “representation reinforcement” more than thirty times to 
describe Ely’s theory). 
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what those outcomes should be.  On this view, constitutional 
rights are responses to two categories of endemic dysfunction 
in democratic politics.  First, the people momentarily holding 
power in a democracy – electoral majorities and their repre-
sentatives in government – have strong incentives to rig the 
democratic system so they remain in power, by enacting (in the 
Carolene Products Court’s words) “legislation which restricts 
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to 
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”75  Expanding on 
Ely and Footnote Four, we might identify two main subcatego-
ries of worry here:76  agency failure, in which legislators or oth-
er government officials seek to protect their positions at the 
expense of the citizenry; and, to borrow James Madison’s term, 
majority faction, by which a majority of citizens, “united and 
actuated by some common impulse … of interest,”77 seeks to en-
trench its preferences against displacement by some future ma-
jority. 
Second, even absent some formal impediment to political 
change, democratic majorities might be misled by “prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities … which tends serious-
ly to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily 
to be relied upon to protect [political] minorities.”78  The worry 
here is that even where the formal mechanics of the democratic 
process remain intact – everyone has full and equal rights of 
__________________________________________________________ 
75 304 U.S. at 152 n4.  Forgive me for remarking that Footnote Four features ar-
guably the highest ratio of doctrinal influence to prose craftsmanship of any textual 
passage in the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence.  See also ELY, supra note 3, 
at 103 (“Malfunction occurs when … the ins are choking off the channels of political 
change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out ….”); and see gen-
erally id. at 105-34 (describing this type of dysfunction and the constitutional re-
sponse to it). 
76 Neither Ely nor the Carolene Products Court were scrupulous about distin-
guishing between these two related but separate categories of political entrench-
ment.  For a more complete discussion, see PETERS, supra note 12, at 255-66. 
77 Federalist No. 10, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 42, at 123.  A reading 
of this and other entries in The Federalist Papers (particularly No. 51) reveals that 
strains of the procedural justification can be traced back to the Founders. 
78 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n4. 
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political participation – some irrational bias (some “common 
impulse of passion” in Madison’s phrase79) will prevent certain 
political minorities from getting a fair hearing in the public de-
bate.  Ely, who focused much of his attention on this concern, of 
course had in mind the case of racial prejudice,80 but the prob-
lem might also arise in other contexts frequently inflected with 
irrational bias:81  gender, religion, alienage, sexual orientation, 
and so on.  Indeed the problem might extend even to cases of 
rational bias – circumstances in which political majorities 
share some “common impulse,” not of blind “passion,” but of 
calculated “interest” that closes their ears and their minds to 
the arguments of those who do not share that interest.82 
According to the Representation-Reinforcement account, the 
occurrence of these types of democratic dysfunction threatens 
the efficacy of democracy as a dispute-resolution mechanism.  
Consider again our warrantless-surveillance hypothetical.  It 
might be that the authorization of such surveillance would be 
appropriate – morally desirable – all things considered; or it 
might be that it would sacrifice too much personal privacy and 
pose too great a risk of government tyranny to be worth the 
candle.  But the “ins” (to use Ely’s term) who currently hold 
power – our chief executive, George, for example – are unlikely 
to be trustworthy arbiters of this debate, precisely because they 
stand to benefit so substantially from one particular resolution 
of it.  And even if George and his advisors can in fact be trusted 
to resolve the debate fairly, they are unlikely to be perceived as 
trustworthy by those affected by their decision. 
On the Representation-Reinforcement approach, this is 
where judicially enforceable constitutional rights come in.  To 
__________________________________________________________ 
79 Federalist No. 10, supra note 77, at 123. 
80 See the extensive discussion in Chapter 6 of ELY, supra note 3, at 135-79.  
81 As Ely of course acknowledged.  See ELY, supra note 3, at 140-41 (“There is 
nothing in the reasoning that establishes the relevance of unconstitutional motiva-
tion that limits it to cases involving racial discrimination.”) 
82 For discussions of this point, see id. at 77-87; PETERS, supra note 12, at 260. 
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subject this issue to the purview of a constitutional right is to 
submit it to a process that is not so saliently tainted by self-
interest:  decision by electorally insulated judges, who are (rel-
atively speaking) “in a position to objectively assess” these 
matters,83 pursuant to general principles laid down by Framers 
who have long since passed from the scene and thus have no 
active stake in the outcome.84  Constitutional rights and judi-
cial review thus can offer a more-impartial forum than demo-
cratic politics for resolving issues in which the danger, or the 
perception, of official self-interest is strong. 
The same point holds where the perceived threat comes from 
majority rather than official self-interest.  Imagine a debate 
over legislation that would punish destruction or defacement of 
certain revered national symbols, like the national flag.85  The 
current political majority is likely to have a horse in that race:  
Its self-interest, as a majority, in retaining its majority status 
(and thus its political power) would be furthered by enactment 
of the law and the resulting deterrence of minority political 
protest.  Giving final say on the issue to the self-interested ma-
jority would hardly encourage acceptance of the result by the 
minority.  But giving final say to a nonmajoritarian process – 
interpretation by politically insular judges of a principles es-
tablished by long-dead framers – might encourage that accep-
tance. 
Finally, consider an issue likely to evoke strongly held “im-
pulse[s] of passion” among a substantial portion of the electo-
__________________________________________________________ 
83 ELY, supra note 3, at 103. 
84 Both Ely and the Carolene Products Court emphasized the relative objectivity 
of federal courts vis-à-vis ordinary democracy; neither mentioned that the constitu-
tional framing process might itself provide an additional measure of impartiality.  
The impartiality-promoting role of the constitutional framing is my own gloss on the 
Representation-Reinforcement approach.  See PETERS, supra note 12, at 252-55, 274-
82.  I believe, however, that adding an emphasis on the framing to a focus on judicial 
review is entirely consistent with the normative and conceptual underpinnings of 
the Representation-Reinforcement account. 
85 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).  
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rate:  a proposal to consider race in university admissions,86 for 
example, or to use taxpayer dollars to support instruction in 
religious schools.87  The specter of bias might threaten the per-
ceived legitimacy of an ordinary democratic resolution of these 
issues.  That threat might be eliminated or mitigated by sub-
jecting the issues to the relatively apolitical process involved in 
creating and applying constitutional rights. 
These, at any rate, are the tenets of the Representation-
Reinforcement defense of constitutional rights.  The central 
idea, again, is that constitutional rights are justified as ways to 
trigger an extrademocratic, and thus relatively impartial, 
process for deciding issues that cannot be trusted to ordinary 
democratic politics.  Representation-Reinforcement is therefore 
a species of Procedural accounts, which justify constitutional 
rights as means of avoiding, resolving, or mitigating certain 
types of disputes about how to proceed.  Constitutional rights, 
on that account, carry authority – they impose a prima facie 
duty of obedience – because, and to the extent that, obeying 
them will settle some disagreement that cannot adequately be 
settled by ordinary democratic means. 
B.  Hamiltonian Accounts as Procedural Justifications 
Before assessing Representation-Reinforcement against the 
elements of legal authority I catalogued in Part II, I should 
note that Hamiltonian and neo-Hamiltonian defenses of consti-
tutional rights, which I cast above in Nuanced Substantive 
terms,88 might also be understood as types of Procedural ac-
counts.  Hamilton attributed “superior … authority” to “solemn 
and authoritative act[s]” of framing and amending a constitu-
tion, by virtue of the enhanced deliberativeness and extraordi-
__________________________________________________________ 
86 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
87 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 
530 U.S. 793 (2000).  
88 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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narily broad participation that typically characterize those 
acts;89 Ackerman’s ideal of “higher lawmaking” during “consti-
tutional moments” expands on this theme.90  Viewed through a 
Nuanced Substantive lens, these theories assert that the fram-
ing process carries authority because of its special capacity to 
generate morally desirable outcomes.  But one reasonably 
could see these theories as making a Proceduralist argument 
instead.  It might be that acts of constitutional framing, by vir-
tue of their specially deliberative and participatory character, 
are better suited than ordinary majoritarian democracy to 
identify the terms of fair democratic participation; if so, then 
obeying the results of these “constitutional moments” might 
promote fairness in ordinary democratic politics.   The same 
might be said for Hamiltonian and neo-Hamiltonian defenses 
of judicial review as a process specially suited to deciding is-
sues of “principle,” “value,” or “political justice”:91  The sup-
posed advantages of judicial review might contribute, not to 
better moral reasoning, but rather to more reliable identifica-
tion of the terms by which democratic processes themselves can 
fairly engage in moral reasoning.92 
The range of plausible Procedural justifications therefore is 
not exhausted by Representation-Reinforcement, and indeed 
many prominent theories might be understood in either Subs-
tantive or Procedural terms.  One potential implication of my 
arguments here, then, is that if we want to assess Hamiltonian 
and similar approaches in their best possible light, we ought to 
understand them as Procedural accounts rather than Substan-
tive ones whenever it is plausible to do so.  
__________________________________________________________ 
89 See Federalist No. 78, supra note 42, at 440. 
90 See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 45.  
91 See BICKEL, supra note 25, at 25 (“principle”); id. at 27 (“enduring general val-
ues”); EISGRUBER, supra note 4, at 57-59 (“principle”); SAGER, supra note 4, at 19 
(“political justice”). 
92 Elsewhere, I have articulated at some length a Procedural justification of con-
stitutional law that incorporates elements from each of these and other theorists.  
See PETERS, supra note 12, at 243-348. 
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C.  Representation-Reinforcement and Legal Authority 
Representation-Reinforcement turns out to be superior to 
Substantive justifications as an account of the authority of con-
stitutional rights.  The key is that Representation-
Reinforcement provides a reason to obey a constitutional right 
that does not hinge on the right’s substantive content. 
1.  Operativeness. – The Simple Substantive Justification, 
remember, is doomed in part by its rather blatant lack of ope-
rativeness.  The only reason it provides for action is to promote 
a morally desirable outcome – a reason that exists, with the 
same force, absent the constitutional right in question.  The 
Nuanced Substantive Justification avoids this problem, but ul-
timately it runs afoul of the Aristotelian Difficulty:  Whatever 
comparative decisional advantage exists in the constitutional 
process becomes attenuated as a right is applied in unforeseen 
circumstances, and the operative reason to obey is correspon-
dingly diluted. 
Representation-Reinforcement avoids both of these prob-
lems.  It supplies, first of all, an operative reason, namely the 
benefits of avoiding, resolving, or mitigating the costs of a dis-
pute.  Assuming this reason, or complex of reasons, exists at 
all, it exists separately and independently of a legal subject’s 
reasons to pursue a morally desirable outcome.  So our hypo-
thetical chief executive, George, has a reason to obey constitu-
tional right R, even if doing so would not promote a morally de-
sirable outcome;93 that reason is that obeying R will promote 
the avoidance, resolution, or mitigation of a dispute about what 
the morally desirable outcome is or how best to promote it.  
And if, as it happens, obeying R would promote a morally de-
sirable outcome, Representation-Reinforcement gives George 
an additional reason to obey:  Obedience will avoid, resolve, or 
__________________________________________________________ 
93 Remember that I mean “morally desirable outcome” in a content-dependent 
sense that is separate from whatever moral status may apply to the procedures used 
to generate that outcome.  See supra text accompanying note 64. 
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mitigate a dispute as well.  By separating the reason to obey 
from the content of the legal right, Representation-
Reinforcement avoids subsuming the question of a right’s au-
thority within the question of whether the right’s content is 
morally desirable. 
What about the Aristotelian Difficulty?  Of course Represen-
tation-Reinforcement is subject to the Difficulty in the sense 
that there may be – almost inevitably will be – exceptions to 
the (secondary) rule that obeying a constitutional right will 
avoid, resolve, or mitigate a dispute that cannot be adequately 
resolved democratically.  So there may (almost inevitably will) 
be situations in which a constitutional right R claims authority 
but in fact lacks it.  But the problem with the Nuanced Subs-
tantive Justification was not simply that its account of legal 
authority was subject to exceptions; the problem was that its 
account of legal authority made widespread exceptions virtual-
ly inevitable.  The Nuanced account made legal authority con-
tingent on the comparative decisional advantage of the process 
P that generated a constitutional right R – on the superior ca-
pacity of P to identify morally desirable results.  Because P was 
unlikely to have considered the particulars of most cases in 
which R would apply, however, its claim to a comparative ad-
vantage of this sort would, in many or most cases, be implausi-
ble. 
Not so on the Representation-Reinforcement account.  That 
account’s claim of legal authority is that obeying R will avoid, 
resolve, or mitigate a dispute that cannot adequately be 
avoided (or resolved or mitigated) by ordinary democracy.  And 
while there surely will be exceptions to this claim, there is no 
inherent reason to think those exceptions will be endemic.  
This is because the Representation-Reinforcement account of 
authority does not turn on the existence of a comparative deci-
sional advantage on moral matters.  It turns instead on the ex-
istence of comparative impartiality in P – on the notion that P 
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can resolve certain kinds of disputes more impartially than or-
dinary democracy can.  And there is no reason why the com-
parative impartiality of P, assuming it exists, is likely to be-
come attenuated in particular cases unforeseen by P. 
To illustrate this point, suppose that right R – a right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, specified over the 
years to entail a right against warrantless searches except in 
certain exigent circumstances – was generated in a relatively 
impartial way as compared to ordinary democratic politics.  Its 
basic underlying principle was authored by framers who are 
now long gone and thus had no stake in the outcome of current 
policy debates.  And that principle has been refined over time, 
through case-by-case adjudication, by judges whose relative po-
litical insularity has immunized them against the self-
interested motives of the political majority and their elected 
representatives. 
Now suppose a particular situation in which R applies – say, 
George’s decision whether to authorize warrantless surveil-
lance – was not foreseen by any of the decisionmakers who con-
tributed to this (relatively impartial) process P by which R was 
created.  Does this fact in any way undermine R’s claim to legal 
authority on the Representation-Reinforcement account?  It 
does not; indeed it appears to strengthen that claim.  The fact 
that P did not foresee the particular circumstances to which R 
now applies may detract from the comparative moral expertise 
of P relative to George – a significant problem on the Nuanced 
Substantive account – but it does not detract at all from the 
comparative impartiality of P relative to ordinary democracy.  
In fact it may enhance the comparative impartiality of P, be-
cause it eliminates any chance that the decisionmakers who 
created R did so in a partial manner, with some interest in the 
outcome of applying R to this particular case.  Decisionmakers 
who did not foresee this case could not possibly have acted par-
tially with respect to it. 
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The Aristotelian Difficulty therefore does not afflict Repre-
sentation-Reinforcement with the same self-erosion problem it 
poses for the Nuanced Substantive Justification.  Exceptions to 
the legal authority claimed by Representation-Reinforcement 
will exist, as they will on any account that makes use of rules.  
But there is no reason to think those exceptions will prove en-
demic. 
2.  Special force. –  I suspect a large part of the intuitive ap-
peal of Substantive justifications, and what may be an intuitive 
suspicion of Procedural ones, has to do with the requirement 
that a legal norm carry special normative force (a prima facie 
duty or something like it) in order to qualify as authoritative.  
Doing what otherwise would be immoral in the name of good 
procedure might seem drily legalistic at best, callously wicked 
at worst.  How can the goal of good procedure possibly provide 
a strong enough reason to justify obeying a morally disagreea-
ble law? 
I think it can, and I have argued as much in other work.94  
Here I will limit myself to three brief points.  First, influential 
empirical research suggests that procedure does in fact matter 
to people in the real world, enough so that people will often 
obey and even respect laws with which they disagree so long as 
they believe the procedure that created those laws was suffi-
ciently fair.95  Representation-Reinforcement and other Proce-
dural accounts thus have a claim to rest on more than ivory-
tower wishful thinking. 
 Second, Procedural justifications as accounts of legal au-
thority generally (not just of constitutional rights) have a long 
and distinguished pedigree, stretching from Thomas Hobbes in 
__________________________________________________________ 
94 See PETERS, supra note 12, at 57-61, 69-105. 
95 See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (rev. ed. 2006).  A 
quick Westlaw search on February 27, 2012 turned up 720 articles citing this or a 
previous edition of Tyler’s book in the law reviews alone. 
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the seventeenth century96 to Jeremy Waldron in the twenty-
first.97  The notion that people might sacrifice (at least some of) 
their substantive commitments in the name of procedural con-
cerns is hardly a radical one. 
Third, as Hobbes made graphically clear,98 it does not re-
quire much imagination to see effective legal procedure as a 
moral imperative.  Effective procedure – procedure capable of 
acceptably avoiding, resolving, or mitigating disputes – may at 
bottom be all that stands in the way of Hobbes’s “Warre of 
every one against every one”:99  A commitment to substantive 
results above all else would mean that good-faith disputes nev-
er get resolved, hardly a recipe for a stable society.  The exis-
tence of civilization therefore is pretty good evidence that pro-
cedure fairly regularly trumps substance. 
So it is at least plausible – I think considerably more than 
plausible – that an account which, like Representation-
Reinforcement, rests on the compelling force of dispute-
resolution can support a prima facie duty of obedience to con-
stitutional rights.  Ultimately, of course, there is no analytical 
way to demonstrate this – only extensive empirical or norma-
tive argument, or both, will do – but suffice it to say that a lit-
tle digging beneath the superficial intuitive suspicion about 
“procedure” is likely to reveal a deeper, more complex intuitive 
__________________________________________________________ 
96 See supra note 62 and sources cited therein. 
97 See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 4, at 232-54.  
98 Hobbes famously imagined a world without law: 
In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor 
use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Build-
ing; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much 
force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; not account of Time; no Arts; 
no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and dan-
ger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and 
short. 
HOBBES, supra note 62, part I, at 186. 
99 Id., part I, at 189. 
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and experiential understanding about the centrality of proce-
dure to any system of law. 
3.  Noncoerciveness. – There is not much to say on this point 
with respect either to Substantive or Procedural justifications.  
In order for legal norms to be truly authoritative (I’ve argued), 
their operativeness and special force must derive from some-
thing other than the threat of official sanctions for disobe-
dience.  Neither Representation-Reinforcement nor any of the 
Substantive accounts relies upon the threat of sanctions as its 
reason to obey constitutional rights.  If any of these justifica-
tions fails as an account of legal authority, then, a failure of 
noncoerciveness will not be the culprit. 
4.  Source-dependence. – Source-dependence is potentially a 
bigger issue.  The Simple Substantive Justification suffers 
from a palpable failure of source-dependence:  Whether the 
outcome of obeying a constitutional right is morally desirable, 
and thus whether there is reason to obey the right, depends en-
tirely on the content of the right itself and not at all on its pe-
digree.  At first blush it may appear that Representation-
Reinforcement faces the same problem.  Isn’t the key question 
on that account – whether obeying a constitutional right will 
avoid, mitigate, or resolve a dispute – a question that can be 
answered without regard to the source of the right? 
The answer is “yes” only on a happenstance basis.  It surely 
is possible that a “constitutional right” scrawled on our peren-
nial cocktail napkin could be sufficient to resolve a dispute.  
George, uncertain what to do in the face of disagreement about 
the warrantless surveillance plan, might decide to obey R just 
because it is there – because it seems to him that some rule of 
decision is better than no rule at all.  For that matter, George 
might decide the issue by tossing a coin.  Many issues – who 
buys the first round, what movie to see, which team receives 
the first kickoff – are in fact decided this way in the real world. 
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But this kind of “any rule is better than none at all” ap-
proach cannot support an account of legal authority generally, 
and certainly not an account of the authority of constitutional 
rights.  Many of the disagreements that are subject to law – 
and virtually all of them that are subject to constitutional 
rights – are too substantial to be resolved by arbitrary or sto-
chastic procedures.  George – and those who disagree with him 
on the merits – are likely to believe the warrantless-
surveillance issue is simply too important to leave to chance; 
the coin toss, or the cocktail napkin, will not be seen as relia-
ble-enough mechanisms to decide such an important issue.  
The question of where to strike the balance between national 
security and individual liberty is vastly different in degree, 
perhaps even in kind, from the question of who buys the first 
round or which team kicks off to start a football game.  And it 
seems likely that this will be true of many or most disputes in-
volving constitutional rights – indeed, of many or most dis-
putes involving law generally.100 
In resolving resolve disputes of this magnitude, the source of 
the resolution – the nature of the process generating the pro-
posed result – is likely to matter.  This point is the essence of 
Representation-Reinforcement, which values constitutional 
rights precisely because they are products of a process that is, 
generally speaking, more impartial than ordinary democratic 
politics.  George’s reason to obey R is not simply that it consti-
tutes a solution or a rule of decision, but rather that the rule it 
constitutes has been forged by a process that he and the other 
relevant parties can accept as relatively impartial.  His reason 
to obey, in other words, is source-dependent.  The same right 
scrawled on a cocktail napkin would have no claim to his ob-
edience. 
__________________________________________________________ 
100 For an extensive argument that stochastic decision-procedures will not be suf-
ficient to support legal authority on a procedural or dispute-resolution account, see 
PETERS, supra note 12, at 69-81. 
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It is worth noting that an insufficient concern for source-
dependence is what dooms the particular theory of legal au-
thority offered by Thomas Hobbes, the father of Procedural ac-
counts (or what elsewhere I have called Dispute-Resolution ac-
counts101) of legal authority.  Hobbes, of course, favored abso-
lute monarchy (the seventeenth-century version of dictator-
ship) as the source of legal norms, because he thought fear of 
an all-powerful monarch would “keep [men] in awe,” stifling 
disputes before they could begin.102  But as Locke later pointed 
out, a Hobbesian absolute monarch would be, and would be 
seen to be, a judge in his own case – the most salient form of 
partiality – and his decrees ultimately would not be accepted 
by his subjects as fair resolutions of disputes.103  Hobbes failed 
to appreciate fully that the source of legal commands, not just 
the bare fact of them, is crucial in dispute-resolution. 
5.  Salience. – The biggest problem with the most persuasive 
type of Substantive justification, the Nuanced version, is a 
dearth of salience.  In fact salience is a challenge for Represen-
tation-Reinforcement as well; I suspect it may be a perennial 
issue for any plausible account of legal authority.  But Repre-
sentation-Reinforcement at least can offer a better account of 
salience than the Nuanced Substantive Justification can. 
Recall the nature of the salience problem with the Nuanced 
account:  A legal subject’s ability to recognize the authority of a 
constitutional right depends on the exact thing the Nuanced 
account says the subject is likely to lack, namely good moral 
__________________________________________________________ 
101 See generally id. 
102 HOBBES, supra note 62, part II, at 227; see generally id., part II, at 223-408. 
103 In his Second Treatise, Locke noted that a Hobbesian monarch could “do to all 
his Subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty in any one to question or 
controle those who Execute his Pleasure.”  JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Govern-
ment, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 13, AT 316-17 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) 
(1689-1690).  This would simply replicate a state of nature, putting the monarch 
effectively into a state of war with his subjects.  See id. §§ 90-94, at 369-74.  The in-
evitable result would be a “long train of Abuses” by the monarch, leading to civil war 
– precisely the evil that government, on Hobbes’s theory, was supposed to avoid.  See 
id. § 225, at 463. 
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judgment about outcomes.  The subject will have to use her 
own moral judgment to assess the comparative decisional ad-
vantage of the process that creates constitutional rights – in-
cluding an assessment of the moral desirability of the outcome 
in the particular case she now faces.  But the entire point of the 
Nuanced account is that the moral judgment of the legal sub-
ject is relatively untrustworthy.  So the account sows the seeds 
of its own demise, or at least of its own weakness. 
Is there a similar element of self-erosion in the Representa-
tion-Reinforcement account?  Representation-Reinforcement 
holds that ordinary democratic politics – as embodied, say, in 
George in his capacity as elected chief executive – is likely to be 
unacceptably partial with respect to certain issues, like wheth-
er the benefits of warrantless surveillance by the government 
are worth its risks.  George’s partiality flows, in this example, 
from self-interest – from the potential to use the surveillance 
as an artificial supplement to George’s power, thus helping 
“keep the ins in and the outs out,” to paraphrase Ely.104  The 
promise of constitutional rights, on the Representation-
Reinforcement account, is their capacity to avoid or mitigate 
this self-interest.  But won’t the same partiality that is likely to 
affect George’s decision on the merits also affect his assessment 
of whether he is, as compared to the constitutional process, rel-
atively partial?  If we can’t trust George to resolve the surveil-
lance issue impartially, how can we trust him to impartially 
resolve the issue of whether he can resolve the surveillance is-
sue impartially? 
A minor part of the answer to this worry is as follows.  The 
self-interest that makes us “distrust” George’s decision on the 
merits (to quote the title of Ely’s book105) may in part be self-
__________________________________________________________ 
104 See ELY, supra note 3, at 103 (“Malfunction occurs when … the ins are chok-
ing off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs 
will stay out ….”). 
105 See generally id. 
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conscious:  There is a danger that George will knowingly re-
solve the surveillance issue in a way that serves his interests.  
His partiality, in other words, may not be inadvertent.  But 
suppose George quite self-consciously decides to disregard con-
stitutional right R because obeying it would hinder his own in-
terests.  This would not be a failure of the salience of R’s au-
thority; rather, it would be an intentional, bad-faith disobe-
dience of R despite (and with knowledge of) its authority.  So, to 
the extent our distrust of George’s decision on the merits is mo-
tivated by the worry of intentional self-dealing, that worry will 
not undermine the salience of R on the Representation-
Reinforcement account, though of course it will create a prac-
tical problem for the implementation of R. 
This is only a minor part of the answer, however, because we 
may have good reason to distrust George’s decision on the me-
rits quite apart from the risk of intentional self-dealing.  Self-
interest and other forms of partiality might invade our deci-
sionmaking without our being aware of it, and if this is the 
case with George, then the same bias that threatens the integr-
ity of his decision on the merits also seems likely to threaten 
his assessment of R’s authority.  George’s self-interest might 
lead him to erroneously deny the comparative impartiality of 
the process that produced R.  And that seems like a threat to 
salience. 
In fact it is not, at least not by itself.  There are two impor-
tant points to be made here.  First, in order for a legal subject 
like George to properly recognize the authority of a constitu-
tional right on the Representation-Reinforcement account, he 
does not need to accurately assess the comparative impartiality 
of the constitutional process vis-à-vis the democratic process of 
which he is a part.  What he needs to accurately assess, rather, 
is others’ perceptions of the comparative impartiality of the 
constitutional process vis-à-vis the democratic process of which 
he is a part.  On Representation-Reinforcement, constitutional 
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rights are justified if obeying them will better resolve (or avoid 
or mitigate) a dispute over certain issues than relying on ordi-
nary democratic politics.  This will be the case if those bound 
by a decision – those who disagree with it on its merits – be-
lieve the decision was made relatively impartially.  It is these 
beliefs about the impartially of the process, therefore – not the 
actual impartiality of the process – that the legal subject (like 
George) must be able to gauge with reasonable accuracy. 
And the fact that George is partial with respect to the ques-
tion on its merits – the question whether to authorize the sur-
veillance – need not make George partial with respect to the 
question of others’ beliefs.  Indeed, even if George turns out to 
be partial with respect to the procedural question of compara-
tive partiality – the question whether in fact he is more partial 
than the process that generated R – he may be entirely impar-
tial on the separate question of others’ beliefs regarding the 
procedural question of comparative partiality.  And it is this 
separate question that ultimately determines R’s authority. 
Suppose, then, that George’s partiality leads him to favor the 
surveillance on its merits.  And suppose the same partiality 
leads him, erroneously, to conclude that the constitutional 
process, P, that generated R is no less partial on the merits 
than he is.  It is entirely possible that George nonetheless will 
conclude, correctly, that most others (other government offi-
cials, members of the public) believe that P is less partial on the 
merits than he is.  And if he concludes this, he will recognize – 
correctly – the authority of R in his case.  His comparative par-
tiality, a premise of Representation-Reinforcement, will not 
have tainted his judgment with respect to the authority of R. 
Note how these analytics distinguish Representation-
Reinforcement from the Nuanced Substantive Justification.  
The latter in essence requires a legal subject to exercise his 
(by-definition) faulty judgment to assess the claims of legal au-
thority.  But the former does not; a legal subject can assess the 
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claims of legal authority without bringing to bear precisely the 
partiality that the account seeks to avoid.  Judgment regarding 
the merits of the dispute is crucially distinct from judgment re-
garding the means of resolving the dispute. 
The first crucial point, then, is that partiality with respect to 
the merits of a disputed question does not by itself threaten sa-
lience.  The second point is an extension of this first one:  It 
will be obvious even to a (by-definition) partial legal subject 
like George that the decision to obey a constitutional right with 
which one disagrees is, and will be perceived as, an impartial 
act.  Suppose again that George’s partiality leads him to favor 
the surveillance on its merits, and also to erroneously deny the 
comparative impartiality of R as a decision of the issue on its 
merits.  Even so, George can hardly fail to realize that submit-
ting to R anyway – deciding to obey R despite his disagreement 
with its merits, despite even his disagreement with its relative 
impartiality – will be seen as an impartial decision.  After all, 
the very fact of his choosing to obey R is a saliently impartial 
resolution of the dispute on the merits.  Clearly such a decision 
would not have been influenced by George’s own partiality, as 
it would generate an outcome opposite to the one George pre-
fers.  And certainly George will understand this – will see that 
his deference to R will be seen as impartial by others – despite 
his partiality on the merits of the issue.  So, if George accepts 
the basis of legal authority that Representation-Reinforcement 
asserts, he will have a strong reason to obey R despite erro-
neously denying its relative impartiality.  The fact of R’s au-
thority, that is, will be salient to George, even though the com-
plete ontology of that authority will not be. 
 This point reveals an interesting and potentially valuable 
aspect of the authority of constitutional rights on the Repre-
sentation-Reinforcement account:  That authority is self-
reinforcing.  If citizens and officials in a society come to believe 
that constitutional rights generally are authoritative because 
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of their comparative impartiality vis-à-vis democratic politics, 
then obedience of those rights will itself come to be seen as an 
impartial act – even if the claim of comparative authority is ob-
scured, or indeed unjustified, in any given case.  Part of the 
point of obeying constitutional rights then will be simply the 
fact of obeying them; that fact alone will contribute to the reso-
lution, avoidance, or mitigation of disputes.  Constitutional 
subjects thus will have good reason to obey constitutional 
rights even where they deny (correctly or incorrectly) the com-
parative impartiality of the process that produced them. 
Note that this phenomenon, too, has no parallel in the 
Nuanced Substantive Justification.  On the Nuanced account, 
an erroneous rejection of the comparative decisional advantage 
of the constitutional process in any given case leaves no re-
maining good reason for obeying a right.  But on Representa-
tion-Reinforcement, erroneous rejection of the comparative im-
partiality of the constitutional process leaves an additional 
reason for obedience:  the potential that the decision to obey a 
right will itself help resolve a dispute. 
So Representation-Reinforcement can provide a better ac-
count of salience than the Nuanced Substantive Justification 
can.  This is not to say that its account of salience is perfect.  It 
seems possible that a participant in democratic politics like 
George might be so partial in a given case that he is blind to 
the dispute-resolving advantages of obeying a constitutional 
right.  But it also seems unlikely that this will occur in a great 
many cases – and certainly less likely than on the Nuanced 
Substantive account, whose very premise seems destined to 
undermine its salience. 
 
* * * 
As a Procedural account, Representation-Reinforcement di-
vorces the reason to obey a constitutional right from the con-
tent of that right.  This maneuver makes the moral status of 
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particular outcomes irrelevant to the authority of rights, thus 
escaping the failure of operativeness that threatens Substan-
tive accounts.  It also, crucially, makes disagreement or confu-
sion over particular outcomes irrelevant to a legal subject’s as-
sessment of the authority of rights, reinforcing the salience of 
that authority.  And by tying dispute-resolution to the nature 
of the process generating constitutional rights, Representation-
Reinforcement provides the source-dependence that legal au-
thority demands.  Representation-Reinforcement therefore 
seems capable of avoiding the foundational weaknesses that 
threaten the authority of constitutional rights on Substantive 
justifications. 
V.  CONCLUSION:  FLEEING SUBSTANCE 
Even staunch defenders of constitutional rights have criti-
cized the Ely/Footnote Four Representation-Reinforcement ap-
proach as a Pollyannish “flight from substance,” resting on an 
unsustainable distinction between “substance” and “procedure” 
and offering a myopic caricature of actual American constitu-
tional practice.106  I think these critiques, on their merits, are 
overblown, as I have argued elsewhere.107  But my point in this 
__________________________________________________________ 
106 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Con-
stitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980), reprinted in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 9 (1985) (retitled The Pointless Flight from Substance); 
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 470 (1981) (origi-
nally entitled The Flight from Substance, see Commentary, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 525, 
539 n.* (1981)), reprinted as DWORKIN, Forum of Principle, supra note 20.  Tribe 
makes both of these critiques, while Dworkin emphasizes the difficulty (in his view 
the impossibility) of distinguishing substance from process in a principled manner.  
107 In A Matter of Dispute, I offer an expanded version of Representation-
Reinforcement that I think meets Dworkin’s objections (although I don’t focus on 
those objections in particular).  The “Dispute-Resolution” account of constitutional-
ism I articulate there – a type of what I call in the instant article a Procedural ac-
count – does not propose a sharp distinction between process and substance, as 
Dworkin accuses Ely of doing.  (See Dworkin, Forum of Principle, supra note 106, at 
57-69.)  Nor does it assume that democracy is “a precise political concept” (id. at 59) 
that can be applied by judges without controversy.  Quite the contrary:  The account 
I offer supposes that the meaning and content of democracy will be subject to vigor-
ous dispute, dispute that is “substantive” on any realistic view; but it asserts, follow-
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article has been a different one.  I’ve suggested here that Re-
presentation-Reinforcement, or some similar type of Procedural 
account, is the only way to make sense of the legal authority of 
constitutional rights – or at least a far better way than Subs-
tantive justifications, which seem to be the only alternatives 
currently available. 
Procedural justifications of constitutional rights might have 
other advantages as well.  It seems to me, for example, that 
their burden of persuasion is somewhat less demanding than 
what the Nuanced Substantive Justification must meet.  The 
Nuanced account must demonstrate that the constitutional 
process is superior to democratic politics, in all or at least the 
large majority of the cases in which it applies, as a way of pro-
ducing morally desirable outcomes.  As our engagement with 
the Aristotelian Difficulty suggests, this will be a pretty tough 
showing to make,108 and indeed I think we can read many of the 
most-trenchant critiques of constitutional rights and judicial 
review as expressions of deep skepticism in this regard.109  Re-
                                                                                                                       
ing Ely, that case-by-case judicial elucidation of constitutionally entrenched norms 
is a more-acceptable way to resolve or mitigate these disputes than is ordinary dem-
ocratic politics.  See PETERS, supra note 12, at 246-55. 
A Matter of Dispute also addresses Tribe’s concern that Representation-
Reinforcement ignores the American Constitution’s many “openly substantive com-
mitments” (Tribe, supra note 106, at 1065 (initial capitalization removed)).  Using 
the example of “substantive due process” – a doctrine that Ely himself rejected, see 
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:  A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920 (1973); ELY, supra note 3, at 14-21 –  I suggest in the book that many seemingly 
“substantive” constitutional commitments can be understood in dispute-resolving, or 
procedural, terms.  See PETERS, supra note 12, at 267-72.  (This suggestion can hard-
ly be rejected out of hand by Tribe or Dworkin, both of whom – Dworkin in particu-
lar – emphasize the impossibility of extricating questions of “procedure” from ques-
tions of “substance.”  See Tribe, supra note 106, at 1067-72; Dworkin, Forum of Prin-
ciple, supra note 106, at 57-69.)  I acknowledge, however, that not all applications of 
substantive due process can comfortably be accommodated to a Dispute-Resolution 
or Procedural account in this way.  See PETERS, supra note 12, at 271. 
108 See supra Parts III.C.3 and III.C.4. 
109 Jeremy Waldron, for example, argues forcefully against the notion that “out-
come-related reasons” – reasons hinging on the moral desirability of results – justify 
a preference for judicial review over majoritarian democracy.  See Waldron, Core 
Case, supra note 38, at 1376-86.  Mark Tushnet has written a book-length indict-
ment of the idea that the outcomes generated by judicial review in the United States 
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presentation-Reinforcement, on the other hand, needs to dem-
onstrate only that the constitutional process is more fair than 
democratic politics with respect to certain issues – no simple 
task, to be sure, but one that seems a bit less Herculean.  We 
might plausibly conclude, for example, that constitutional 
judges typically are more disinterested than legislators with 
regard to questions of agency failure, even as we deny that 
judges possess a special moral wisdom that legislators and 
their constituents somehow lack.110 
But the merits of an account as a matter of policy mean very 
little if that account cannot explain the authority of constitu-
tional rights.  Constitutional rights can hardly make the world 
a better place if those subject to them have no good reason to 
obey them.  A persuasive narrative of legal authority therefore 
must reside at the heart of any justification of constitutional 
rights.  And without a flight from substance – without, in less 
abashed terms, the banishment of substance – no narrative of 
constitutional authority, perhaps no narrative of legal authori-
ty more generally, can persuade. 
                                                                                                                       
have been morally desirable on the whole.  See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
110 On this point, see PETERS, supra note 12, at 282-86. 
